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Cash breeds Success:
The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of nancing constraints on the equilibrium of
a patent race. We develop a model where rms nance their R D expenditures
with an investor who cannot verify their e ort. We solve for the optimal nancial
contract of any rm along its best-response function. In equilibrium, any rm in
the race is more likely to win the more cash and assets it holds prior to the race,
and the less cash and assets its rivals hold prior to the race. We use NBER evidence
from pharmaceutical patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 in the US, patent
citations, and COMPUSTAT to measure the e ect of all the racing rms cash
holdings on the equilibrium winning probabilities. The empirical ndings support
our theoretical predictions.
Keywords: Patent Race, optimal contract, innovation, nancial constraints.
JEL Classi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Do a rm s nancing constraints a ect its decisions to pursue innovation Since Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen s (1988) seminal paper, economists have found that nancing matters
through various channels for total rm level investment in R D. For example, Hall (1992)
shows that the source of nancing matters and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) show that
internal nance predicts R D expenditures of small high tech rms. But do a rm s nancing
constraints also a ect its rivals decisions to pursue innovations
To our surprise, the role of nancing constraints in patent races has not been compre-
hensively studied in the literature. Theorists have focused mainly on how rms R D e ort
depends on technological standing and market structure.1 In this paper, we incorporate -
nancing constraints explicitly into Reinganum s (1983) seminal model and test the model s
comparative statics predictions empirically. In our model, rms nance their R D expendi-
tures with internal and external funds. The probability of making the discovery at a point
in time depends on the e ort exerted by the entrepreneur, which cannot be veri ed by the
investor. In equilibrium, nance is costly for the entrepreneur and the marginal cost of innov-
ative activity is increasing in the fraction of outside funds to the total investment, very much
following the logic proposed by ensen and Meckling (1976). An increase in the marginal cost
of innovating shifts a rm s best response function downwards which in turn decreases the
rm s equilibrium R D expenditures. The practical upshot is that in a setting of strategic
interactions, deep pockets are a source of comparative advantage. This prediction is testable
and is at the core of our empirical investigation.
We face two major empirical challenges. First, we need data that combines nancial
information with a racing environment. We use the NBER Patent Citations Data File
developed by Hall, a e and Trajtenberg (2002), which records all utility patents granted in
the United States between 1963 and 1999 . Every patent granted after 1975 is linked to all
the patents it cites and to the CUSIP code of the assignee as it appears in COMPUSTAT.
We merge the patent records with COMPUSTAT to obtain the nancial data of the rms
in the race before the patent was awarded. To make sure that the patent awards capture
innovative success, we focus on the drug industry, where patents are crucial to reap the
returns to R D investment (see Levin et al., 1987, and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000)
and where rms use the exclusivity of the drug patent to block imitation during and after
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the clinical trials phase of the development.2 Second, we need to identify in the data which
rms are e ectively racing for each patent. We propose here a method to pre-select the
rms most likely to race for a patent based on the model s prediction that rms with a very
low expected probability of winning a race will rather drop out. This probability itself is
predicted using the rm s ownership of the prior technology and the past record of winning
patents of the same class.
Our model links the probability that any rm in the race wins to the characteristics of all
the rms in the race, e.g., their nancial resources and the value of their prior innovations.
A rm is more likely to win a given race the higher its wealth and the lower its rivals
wealth. To test this prediction we t a multinomial logistic model that selects the winner as
a function of these variables. We nd that a rm s probability of winning a race is increasing
-on average- in its stock of cash and decreasing in its rivals stock of cash. The predicted
impacts are not only statistically signi cant but also economically meaningful: di erences
in stocks of cash imply large di erences in the probability of winning.
Our empirical analysis distinguishes between the ability to nance R D internally and
externally. Besides using its own generated cash to nance R D internally, the rm can
also pledge its less liquid resources to reduce the cost of external nance. We nd that the
total asset value of a rm increases its probability of winning but decreases that of its rivals.
Because we use only COMPUSTAT rms, it is not surprising that we nd that innovation
success is generally more sensitive to the value of assets than to cash holdings. Indeed, it
is likely that these rms became public to have better access to external nance in the rst
place. Interestingly, though, we nd that innovation success has become as sensitive to cash
as it is to assets in the late 90s.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature but novel in its focus and com-
prehensiveness. The literature has devoted some attention to the commitment e ects of
nancial structure on pricing, output, and investment strategies in oligopolistic product
market games. A capital structure choice that is observed by rivals can make a rm re-
duce its prices or increase investment (see Brander and Lewis, 1986 Maksimovic, 1988, and
Rotemberg and Scharfstein, 1990 Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986 and Bolton and Scharfstein,
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1990). Chevalier (1995) shows that increased leverage in the supermarket industry softened
competition, whereas ensen and Showalter (2004) show that increased leverage decreases
rm-level R D expenditures. We depart from this literature in two respects. First, we
assume that nancing choices are not observable to rivals, so that the commitment e ects
of nancing choices play no role. We believe that our assumption is appropriate to analyze
the interaction between large rms, where rivals nd it di cult to disentangle the nancing
of individual projects from the overall nancing of the concern. Second, we do not take the
form of the contracts as given but work from rst principles, i.e., we derive the equilibrium
nancing contracts for competitors given their nancing gap. Thus, we focus on a di erent
comparative statics exercise. Instead of varying the capital structure directly, we vary the
rm s ability to nance herself internally and externally, which in turn induces changes in
the capital structure.
Our empirical investigation explores a game theoretic setup with a comprehensive data
base. Only few studies share these two features. Blundell, Gri th and Van Reenen (1999)
study the relationship between market share and innovation using a panel of British phar-
maceutical rms. They nd that leading rms innovate more often. In contrast to their
study, we incorporate nancing explicitly into ours and show that nancing matters even if
we control for technological leadership and patenting experience.
Cockburn and Henderson (1994) address whether or not R D investments are strategic.
Gathering detailed data at the individual project level for ten of the largest rms in the
pharmaceutical industry, they nd that research investments are only weakly correlated
across rms. However, as they acknowledge, their study may miss correlations between
investments of smaller potential entrants and the large rms by focusing only on the large
players.3 We identify strategic behavior from the outcome of the races and not the inputs
rms devote to these races. We are thus able to use a much more comprehensive data base
and show that the winning probabilities of rms are signi cantly a ected by other rms
characteristics. Moreover, as mentioned above, we include measures of the rms nancial
wealth in the empirical analysis.
Lerner (1997) nds evidence of strategic interaction in R D: the leaders in the disk drive
industry between 1971 and 1988 were less likely to improve their disk drive density than the
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laggards.4 Lerner is able to identify this e ect through the distance of a rms current drive
density to the industry s maximum. In contrast to the drugs industry, not only the rst but
any rm that innovates is rewarded for its R D in the disk drive industry. Therefore, he
treats observation errors independently across rms. We cannot rely on such assumptions in
the pharmaceutical industry because, in a race, the success of any rm is jointly determined
by the characteristics of all the rms that race. Our approach identi es strategic behavior
from the dependence of the outcome of races on all the competitors characteristics.5
Hellman and Puri (2000) also study the empirical relationship between product market
strategies and nance. They nd evidence that budding rms with innovative strategies are
more likely to be funded by venture capitalists. Our results are consistent with theirs insofar
as rms with a bigger expected probability of success at innovation are externally nanced
at smaller costs. However, in our setup, the expected probability of success is not taken as
given but determined endogenously in a Nash Equilibrium, conditional on the technological
standing of rms and the availability of cash before the race.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section develops the model
and shows that wealthier rms are more likely to win patent races. Section 2 describes
our data sources and discusses their relevance to test the comparative statics results of our
model. Section 3 shows how our model s equilibrium innovation probabilities map directly
into an estimable multinomial selection and section 4 discusses the econometric speci cation
we use to select rms into the race. Section 5 presents the results from estimating the
winner selection model and section 6 extends the analysis to the determination of rm-level
R D. Section 7 summarizes our ndings and concludes brie y. All proofs are gathered in
an appendix.
1 Theory
We consider the nancing of research in a version of the Reinganum (1983) model . There
are n rms, indexed i = 1; : : : ; n; that obtain current ow pro ts i from producing state-
of-the-art products. The rms can enter a research race for a higher quality product. We
model the uncertain success in this research race as the outcome of a Poisson process. The
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state-of-the-art products and the innovation are protected by patents of in nite length. If
rm i innovates, then its ow pro t increases to i > i and the ow pro ts of rms j = i
drop to j j: This formulation allows for the case where i = 0 for some i and or j = 0
for some j: Hence, the model can capture both drastic and non-drastic innovations.
If a rm enters the research race, it has to spend a xed cost F: Once this cost is sunk
the entrepreneur running rm i can exert a ow of e ort ai: If a rm spends a constant ow
of e ort ai; then the conditional likelihood at any point in time to innovate within the next
instant given that it has not innovated before is ai ; where  < 1: The cost of e ort is equal
to ai: Firms have limited nancial resources, Wi: If Wi < F the rm needs outside funds to
nance the xed cost.6
We assume that many investors compete in Bertrand fashion for the right to nance a
rm s investment. They make take-it-or-leave-it o ers to rms and then rms decide whether
or not to accept the contract.7 A rm withWi < F that rejects its contract cannot innovate,
i.e., has probability of innovation equal to zero for all ai: After the rm has accepted a
contract, it chooses its research intensity ai:
We assume that contracts between investor and rm are not observable to other investors
and rms. That is, we adopt the simultaneous move assumption from Reinganum (1983)
and solve for the Nash Equilibrium. We do not consider sequential (Stackelberg) games
where one rm can observe the nancing of the other rm before it chooses its research
intensity. This rules out commitment e ects of nance. Our comparative statics results are
not a ected by this modeling choice.
We begin our analysis with the derivation of rms best responses, rst characterizing
optimal contracts and then a rm s research intensity that results from accepting an optimal
contract.
1.1 Optimal nancing
The Poisson nature of research implies that there are n classes of positive probability events,
distinguished by the rm that innovates rst. Within these classes, events di er only in the
time of innovation. We consider stationary contracts where the repayment conditions depend
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on whether a rm wins the race but not on when the rm wins. Moreover, since i does
not depend on which rm j = i innovates, the repayments of a losing rm do not depend
on the identity of the winning rm. Hence, from the perspective of contracting within a
rm-investor coalition, the research process has three relevant outcomes at any time t: (i)
some rm j = i wins the race, (ii) rm i wins the race, and (iii) no rm innovates. We place
no further restrictions on the form of contracts. Contracts with any arbitrarily complex
time-dependent repayments (in the sense of the length of time elapsed since the arrival of
the innovation) have a simple equivalent representation where the rm commits to repay a
constant share si of i from the start of the race until the innovation is found by some rm,
and constant shares s i and s
+
i of pro ts i and i thereafter, respectively. Since everybody
is risk-neutral, all that matters is the present value of the repayment stream.
Our aim is to have a simple model to derive comparative statics predictions of equilibrium
research intensities with respect to a rm s wealthWi: By de nition, such a dependency arises
only in a second-best world, where F  Wi, the investment by the investor, is large relative
to the values of i and i: Otherwise the rm becomes a safe investment, because it is able
to repay the investor in every state of the world. For the remainder of this section, we focus
only on the case where the rst-best is not implementable.
An optimal contract speci es that a rm repays all its pro ts if either no rm or another
rm innovates. We prove this result in Lemma 1, in the appendix. We now proceed to analyze
optimal contracting by backwards induction. First, we characterize the best contracts that
can be o ered to a rm. Then, we discuss whether or not the rm will accept such a contract.
1.1.1 Characterization of second-best contracts
Let h
X
j 6=i
aj and let Vi
 
h; s+i

denote the value of rm i s claim of future pro ts for
given values of the other rms aggregate research activity and the investor s repayment
share s+i . Firm i s problem is to accept or reject a contract o ered by the investor and to
choose its research e ort conditional on accepting. The second stage of rm i s problem can
be described by the following asset equation:
rVi
 
h; s+i

dt = max
ai

ai
  
1  s+i

V +i   Vi
 
h; s+i

  hVi
 
h; s+i

  ai
	
dt; (1)
7
where r is the risk-free interest rate and V +i
i
r
, i.e., the net present value of the perpetual
ow of pro ts, i; starting at the time of innovation. We assume that V
+
i > F: In a short
interval of time between t and t + dt rm i innovates with probability ai dt and any of the
other rms innovates with probability hdt: In case rm i innovates, the rm receives a share 
1  s+i

of all future pro ts and thus a claim that is worth
 
1  s+i

V +i as of the time of
innovation. If any rm innovates, rm i loses the value of its current claim, Vi
 
h; s+i

: The
ow cost of research during the small interval of time is aidt:
The maximization problem on the right hand side of (1) is strictly concave in ai: Let
ai
 
s+i

denote a solution to this problem. The rst-order condition,

 
ai
 
s+i
 1   
1  s+i

V +i   Vi
 
h; s+i

= 1; (2)
is necessary and su cient for the unique optimal choice of ai
 
s+i

induced by the contract
F  Wi; s
+
i
	
: We can multiply both sides of condition (2) by ai
 
s+i

and obtain the con-
dition

 
ai
 
s+i
   
1  s+i

V +i   Vi
 
h; s+i

= ai
 
s+i

: (3)
If we substitute condition (3) into the asset equation (1) we can solve for the value of the
entrepreneur s claim in rm i
Vi
 
h; s+i

=
 
1  s+i
 (1  )  ai  s+i  V +i
(1  )
 
ai
 
s+i

+ h+ r
: (4)
Let Bi
 
h; s+i

denote the value of the investor s claim in the rm. The investor receives
the pro ts i as long as no rm innovates and receives the value V
 
i
i
r
from the time of
innovation onwards if any rm j = i innovates. Moreover, the investor receives a share s+i
of the pro t i from the time of innovation onwards. Bi
 
h; s+i

satis es
rBi
 
h; s+i

dt =

ai
 
s+i
  
s+i V
+
i  Bi
 
h; s+i

+ h
 
V  i  Bi
 
h; s+i

+ i
	
dt:
Dividing by dt and rearranging, we can solve for Bi
 
h; s+i

and get
Bi
 
h; s+i

=
ai
 
s+i

s+i V
+
i + hV
 
i + i
ai
 
s+i

+ h+ r
:
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Individual rationality of the investor requires that Bi
 
h; s+i

F  Wi: Perfect competition
in the market for funds drives the investor s pro ts to zero, so
ai
 
s+i

s+i V
+
i + hV
 
i + i
ai
 
s+i

+ h+ r
= F  Wi: (5)
The investor s problem is to maximize Vi
 
h; s+i

with respect to s+i subject to (2) and
(5) : We can use (2) and (5) to eliminate s+i and characterize the solution in terms of the
induced e ort level. Let a^i denote a level of research e ort by rm i as induced by a contract
that satis es (2) and (5). Substituting (4) and (5) into (2) we conclude that a^i must satisfy
the condition

 
 
a^i V
+
i + hV
 
i + i   (a^

i + h+ r) (F  Wi)

(h+ r)  a^i ((1  ) a^

i + h+ r) = 0:
(6)

 (a^i; ) is strictly concave in a^i: Hence (6) has at most two distinct solutions. Let a

i denote
an e ort level induced by an optimal contract. It is now easy to see that ai is the largest
solution of (6) : The reason is as follows. The investor just breaks even, so the rm receives
all of the surplus. The rm s e ort is distorted downwards (which can be seen from (2)).
Hence, it is desirable to induce the highest possible e ort level. Note also that this implies
that the optimal contract is unique and moreover at a^i = a

i we have
@
(ai ;)
@a^i
< 0. Since we
look at the case where the rst-best level of e ort is not implementable, we have 
 (0; ) =

 
hV  i + i   (h+ r) (F  Wi)

(h+ r) < 0 (see Lemma 1, for a proof that strict inequality
holds). So, given that 
 (a^i; ) is concave in a^i; it must be downward-sloping at a

i whenever
(6) has a solution.
1.1.2 Existence and acceptance of contracts
The existence of an optimal contract, depends on the aggressiveness of the rival rms, as mea-
sured by h. One can show that for all Wi 0 and F there exists h h
 
V +i ;Wi; V
 
i ; i; F

such that a unique optimal contract exists if and only if h h: The threshold h is non-
decreasing in the rst four arguments and non-increasing in the last one. The intuition for
these results is straightforward. The higher the research e ort chosen by the rival rms, the
smaller the expected value of the prize for a given e ort level by rm i. As a result, the value
of the investor s claim is decreasing in h for xed s+i ; and the investor requires a larger share
of pro ts the higher is h: But an increase in s+i decreases rm i s incentive to provide e ort.
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For a large enough h; this discouragement e ect is so strong that an optimal contract ceases
to exist. On the other hand, an increase in V +i ; V
 
i ; i; Wi, or a reduction of F balances
these e ects, so that the higher is the value of the race, the larger is the critical level of
the rival rms aggregate likelihood of winning, h; that chokes o rm i s innovative e orts.
Likewise, the higher is the rm s wealth, the smaller is the amount of money needed from
the investor and the less discouraging is an increase in the other rms aggregate research.
Consider now rm i s decision whether or not to accept the contract. Let the optimal
sharing rule if rm i wins be denoted by s+i s
+
i
 
h; V +i ; V
 
i ; i;Wi; F

. The rm accepts
the optimal contract if and only if the net present value of its investment is nonnegative,
that is if
Vi
 
h; s+i

 Wi 0:
Suppose V +i is su ciently large so that rm i engages in research for h = 0: Then, one can
show that for all Wi 0 and F; there exists h > 0 such that rm i accepts the optimal
contract if and only if h h
 
V +i ; V
 
i ; i;Wi; F

: h has essentially the same comparative
statics properties as h has; so we omit a further discussion.
1.1.3 Induced behavior in the race
Let the function bi (h;Wi; ) denote the e ort level induced by the optimal contract as a
function of h; the rival rms aggregate likelihood of winning, and the rm s wealth (and
further parameters of the contracting problem). We note that bi (h;Wi; ) is positive and
increasing in h for all h min
n
h; h
o
and is equal to zero otherwise. Applying the implicit
function theorem to condition (6) ; we have that
dai
dWi
=
@
(ai ;Wi;)
@Wi
 
@
(ai ;Wi;)
@a^i;
;
where
@
(ai ;Wi;)
@Wi
=  (ai + h+ r) (h+ r) > 0 and the denominator is positive because a

i
is the larger one of the solutions to equation (6). Thus, whenever bi (h;Wi; ) > 0 and the
e ort level is second-best, dbi(h;Wi;)
dWi
> 0:
If the rst-best level of e ort is implementable, then an increase in Wi has no e ect
whatsoever on the rm s best response. The best-response function in this case coincides
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with the one in Reinganum s model. However, in the second best, the larger is F   Wi;
the larger is the repayment share to the investor and the smaller the rm s e ort choice.
Intuitively, an increase in F   Wi increases the agency costs of nance and increases the
rm s marginal costs of innovative activity.
1.2 Equilibrium comparative statics and testable implications
We now show that equilibria of our game display natural comparative statics. We present
these results rst for the special case where there are two rms, and then present a general-
ization to the case of an arbitrary number of rms.
1.2.1 The case of two rms
For two rms, our game admits two kinds of equilibria for di erent parameter constellations.
First, there exist equilibria where both rms are active and the equilibrium research e orts,
ai for i = 1; 2; are both positive. Second, there exist also equilibria where only one rm
enters the research race and the other rm stays out. When the prizes the rms can win,
V +i , are su ciently large relative to the cost of entering the race, F; then both rms must
be active in any equilibrium. Whenever such an equilibrium exists, it has the following
properties:
Proposition 1 Consider a stable, interior equilibrium. Formally, suppose that for i = 1; 2
and j = i;
 
ai ; a

j

>> 0 and
dbi(aj ;Wi)daj  < 1 around  ai ; aj : If in addition
i) F > max
n
Wi +
aj V
 
i +i
aj +r
;Wj +
ai V
 
j +j
ai +r
o
; then
dai
dWi
> 0; moreover,
dai
dWi
>
daj
dWi
> 0:
ii) F < Wi +
aj V
 
i +i
aj +r
; then ai and a

j are independent of Wi:
Proposition 2 In a stable, interior equilibrium, the probability that rm i wins the race is
non-decreasing in Wi and strictly increasing in Wi if F > Wi +
aj V
 
i +i
aj +r
:
The intuition for the results is quite simple. An increase in rm i s wealth improves the
contracts that can be o ered to this rm and hence increases this rm s research e ort. In
other words, the best reply of rm i to any given research e ort of rm j is increased. Firm
j adjusts to this change by increasing its own research e ort along its best reply function.
While the rst e ect tends to increase the probability that rm i wins the race, the second
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e ect tends to reduce it. However, in a stable equilibrium, the former e ect always dominates
the latter.
1.2.2 A case of n > 2 rms
The general n > 2 rms version of our race is di cult to treat analytically. While we
conjecture that our main results hold in general, we con ne ourselves here to develop a
simpli ed n rm version that remains analytically tractable.8 Suppose rm i s level of wealth
is low enough so that its level of research e ort, for given e ort levels of the other rms,
is second-best optimal. Suppose further that all rms j = i are wealthy enough so that
their research e orts, for given e orts of the other rms, correspond to their rst-best levels.
Finally, let V  j = j = 0 and V
+
j = V
+ for all j = i: By construction, any rm j = i
faces exactly the same incentives at the margin where it chooses its research e ort. For
large enough values of V + all such rms participate in the race and the overall game has an
equilibrium where they all behave identically.
Let a i denote the equilibrium e ort level of any rm j = i:We have the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Wi +
(n 1)a iV
 
i +i
(n 1)a i+r
< F < Wj for all j = i. Then, in a stable,
interior equilibrium, the probability that rm i wins the race is strictly increasing in Wi:
1.2.3 Testable implications
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 establish that improved nancing conditions improve a rm s strate-
gic position, and its chances of winning. While wealth is a one-dimensional measure in our
theory, the empirical investigation will have to distinguish between inside and outside -
nance. The rm can either use its own generated cash to nance its R D expenditures
internally or pledge its assets to reduce the cost of using external nance. The immediate
testable implication is that, given a level of pledgeable assets, the rm s winning probability
increases with the level of cash and that, given a level of cash holdings, the rm s winning
probability increases with the level of pledgeable assets. Moreover, the winning probability
of any other rm j = i in the race decreases with the level of cash or assets of rm i:
The e ects of the remaining parameters on the equilibrium research e orts are ambiguous.
Anything that increases i (say, an increase in demand) will also increase j: As a result
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both reaction functions are shifted upwards by an increase in the value of the patent race
as measured by V +i and V
+
j and the e ect on the equilibrium e orts is unclear. Increases
in i and i have two e ects. On the one hand it may become feasible to write rst-best
contracts so that the rm s best response function shifts up. On the other hand, an increase
in operating pro ts makes the rm reluctant to destroy these pro ts, so that it reduces its
research e orts and its best response function shifts downwards.
We now proceed to investigate whether the key predictions of our model as outlined in
Propositions 1 through 3 are veri ed empirically. We start by describing how we construct
our data set and how we de ne our observational unit, the race for a patent pool, from this
data.
2 The data
We use two sources of data. The rst is the NBER Patent Citations Data File developed
by Hall, a e and Trajtenberg (2002). This data set comprises all utility patents granted in
the United States between 1963 and 1999 and records their technological category, the dates
of award and their assignees. Each patent awarded after 1975 is linked to all the patents it
cites and the assignee names in the patent records are matched to the name of the company
as it appears in COMPUSTAT. From COMPUSTAT we get the nancial information of the
patent assignees whose stock is publicly traded in the U.S.
2.1 Patenting in the pharmaceutical industry
The NBER Patent Citations Data File is useful to identify racing behavior only in industries
that rely heavily on patent protection to appropriate the returns of R D. It is well recognized
that patenting is crucial to protect R D in the pharmaceutical industry (see the survey
conducted by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987), and its follow-up by Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh (2000)). Moreover, the race for the patent is the best stage to test for
strategic interactions during the drug discovery process. The exclusivity rights on a new
drug are only contestable during the pre-clinical stage. After that, only the patent holder
may conduct the clinical trials without the threat of imitation.
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2.2 Measuring the value of a patent
It will prove useful to explore the predictions of our model conditional on the value of the
patent by estimating our model across value quartiles. Since the value of a patent is not
readily observable, we use the best available proxy we follow Harho , Scherer, and Vopel
(2003), who nd a strong positive association between the number of citations received and
the value of each patent reported by their owners in a survey of German rms. Because
the raw count of citations is prone to biases due to time di erences in the patent o cers
propensity to add or drop citations, we adjust it using the coe cients provided by Hall et
al. (2005).9
2.3 Patents versus patent pools as units of observation
Cohen et al. (2000) categorize industries into discrete and complex technologies. Dis-
crete innovations comprise single patents that are used to prevent imitation. The pharma-
ceutical industry belongs to the discrete technology category. In contrast, rms that develop
complex technologies (software, electrical equipment) accumulate bundles of patents to in-
duce rivals to negotiate property rights over complementary technologies (Hall, 2004). To
ensure that we meet our model s assumption of discrete type technologies, we restrict our
sample to patents in the technological category 3, i.e., Drugs and Medical, and the subcate-
gories 31, 33 and 39: Drugs, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous Drugs, respectively (see Hall,
et al. (2005) for a de nition of these categories).
Even in this restricted sample, it is still debatable whether each patent can be treated as
the outcome of a race. Although most authors argue in favour of one patent per race, to be
sure, we explore the possibility that patents in our data may be pooled.10 We group together
all patents led by the same rm on the same day, week or month that were subsequently
also granted the same day, week or month, respectively. We nd that there is signi cant
clustering in the same week: 52 of the patents in subcategories 31, 33 and 39 are led
together with at least one other patent in the same week, and then approved together in the
same week (Figure 1). In fact, 50 of all patents are led together by the same rm with
another patent on the same day.
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<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Table I shows the consequences of grouping individual patents into pools of all patents led
the same week. The 77,704 individual patents owned by corporations (Panel A) are grouped
into 37,283 pools (Panel B). The average pool comprises two patents but an overwhelming
majority comprises only one (median of 1, max of 50). This grouping seems appropriate:
of all patents grouped in the weekly pool, a single one receives most of the future citations.
On average, the most cited patent in the pool gets 89 of the pool s total citations (median
of 100 ). The citations received by the pool are strongly concentrated, with an average
concentration index of 0.45 (Panel B).
<INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE>
The exercise above shows that the patents that are never cited are typically led together
with others that are. Austin (1993) uses the same weekly grouping for biotech, and obtains
the same result. The weekly grouping seems to capture in each pool the essential patent
that was being raced for and rules out many of the patents that are never cited as individual
races. While the weekly grouping still yields many pools of single, non-cited patents, a
broader de nition of a pool, which includes all patents led the same month, yields similar
results. Indeed, the most cited patent in the pool still concentrates 72 of the total number
of citations. Further, the monthly pooling reduces the number of pools to 28,430 and risks
grouping di erent races into one. We choose the weekly grouping, which only risks having
too many races of no value. By conducting our empirical tests across value quartiles - where
value is measured by the pool s citations count - we ensure that the inference in the top
quartiles is free of such a risk.
2.4 COMPUSTAT match
We cannot match all the patents to COMPUSTAT, primarily because not all winners are
publicly traded rms. In fact, there is a large proportion of patents owned by universities,
individuals and the public sector. Table I summarizes and compares the main characteristics
of the matched patents to those of the patent universe.11
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We nd a COMPUSTAT match for the winners of 40 of the total number of patents
awarded to corporations. Panel B shows that, on average, the COMPUSTAT-matched patent
pool is cited twice as many times as the average patent pool awarded to a rm. In fact,
as many as 24,302 (84 ) of the unmatched pools are never cited, whereas relatively few of
the COMPUSTAT-matched pools (14 ) received no citations. Our match essentially drops
a disproportionate amount of patents that seem to be of little or no value, for which it is
extremely unlikely that an R D race ever took place.
Our matching rate is higher for the pools of patents that receive more citations. Our
overall matching rate of 22.5 is broken down into a rate of 13.35 in the rst quartile of
citations received, 15.84 in the second, 23.35 in the third, and a maximum rate of 38.15
in the fourth quartile. Again, because we estimate our model across all quartiles of citation
counts, we can assess ex-post how the inference is a ected by losing, on average, patents
that are cited less after the COMPUSTAT match.
We acknowledge that there are still many potentially valuable patents that we haven t
been able to match with COMPUSTAT. In fact, there are 7,622 unmatched pools that are
cited as often as the upper half of the matched ones. Panel B also shows that the unmatched
patents are won by rms with much less experience, clearly, rms that are public but small
or private. Sections 5 and 7 interpret the inference we derive from the matched patents
considering this omission.
We note nally that our matched sample of patents does not only include US rms.
We have indeed matched most of the non US rms that are important players in the US
races. These rms have securities traded in the US (e.g., through ADR programs) and are
therefore covered in COMPUSTAT.12 The following section derives an econometric model of
a patent race from our theoretical model, and explains how we use it to test our theoretical
predictions.
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3 The econometric approach
3.1 Nash equilibrium winning probabilities
Let ik a

ik denote the best response hazard rate of rm i 1; 2; :::; nk k in race k:
The Nash equilibrium is a vector of hazard rates k that solves the system
ik = 
 
Wik; Eik;ik;Cik;

 ik

i k; (7)
where the vectorWik includes our measures of nancial wealth of rm i before race k, Eik
our measure of rm i s patenting experience before race k, ik the values of all the patent
pools owned by rm i that are being replaced by patent k and Cik the vector of other control
variables. Conditional on Xik (Wik; Eik;ik;Cik) and 

 ik; rm i s date of innovation,
Tik; follows a Poisson process. Therefore, the probability that i wins race k against all other
racing rms j k is
Pr( rm i wins race k) = Pr (Tik Tjk j k) =
Z 1
0
e
 (ik+
P
j 6=i2Nk
jk)tikdt =
ikP
j2Ni
jk
:
Because the Nash Equilibrium of the race is the solution to the system (7), we can write
each rm s hazard rate and winning probability as a function of its own and the other rms
characteristics as
Pr (i wins race k) =
ik (Wk;Ek;k;Ck)P
j2Nk
jk (Wk;Ek;k;Ck)
; (8)
where Xk (Wk;Ek;k;Ck) is the full data vector for race k, collecting the characteristics
of all rms in race k before the race starts.
3.2 The empirical winning probabilities
If we approximate the equilibrium hazard rate function by a parametrized exponential func-
tion of the form ik exp(
0
1Xik + 
0
2X ik); then, for 1   2 ; we have
ik (Xk)P
j2Nk
jk (Xk)
exp(01Xik + 
0
2X ik)P
j2Nk
exp(01Xik + 
0
2X ik)
=
exp(
0
Xik)P
j2Nk
exp(
0
Xjk)
:
Expanding the product terms and adding noise terms ik for all i; we obtain
Pr( rm i wins race k) =
exp(
0
WWik + EEik + 
0
ik + 
0
CCik + ik)P
j2Nk
exp(
0
WWjk + EEjk + 
0
jk + 
0
CCjk + jk)
; (9)
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the multinomial logit function (MNL). W ;E; and C are the parameters to estimate
and ik represents the characteristics of i that are unobserved by the econometrician but
known by all the rms.
The MNL is ideal to test the comparative statics of the equilibrium of the race because
it maps the given characteristics of the game directly into the winning probabilities. As in
equation (8) ; the MNL allows us to eliminate the equilibrium hazard rates and focus on the
observable outcome, that is, who is the winner. Moreover, the MNL respects the fact that
the winning probabilities are derived from the comparison of every competitor s vector of
characteristics.
3.3 Specication
The main variables of interest in our model are the measures of nancial wealth, W. The
rm can use its own generated cash to nance its R D expenditures internally or pledge its
less liquid resources to reduce the cost of using external nance. It is therefore crucial to
distinguish between the ability to use its own resources from the ability to borrow at a lower
cost.
The vector, W, includes the logarithm of the rm s cash holdings (COMPUSTAT item
36). The more cash available the more resources the rm can devote to R D and the more
likely the rm is to win the race. W also includes the logarithm of the total value of the
rm s assets as a measure of the rm s ability to nance its R D gap at lower borrowing
costs: the larger the rm, the more it can pledge as collateral for a given amount to nance,
and the more R D it can undertake in equilibrium.
We include the total number of patents accumulated by the rm in the same class up to
one year before the date of the award of the patent to control for the e ectiveness of the
rm in obtaining patents. We expect that players who have accumulated more patents in
the past in the same class will be more experienced in the patenting process and thus be
more likely to obtain a new patent, ceteris paribus.
To test whether the pro ts from the rm s pre-existing patents, which were denoted by
i in the model, increase or decrease the incentives to innovate we include proxies for i
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into our empirical model: We term the e ects of i incumbency e ects and measure them
by an incumbency index , which is a citation count of the cited patents constructed as
follows. For each patent pool k that we consider as a race we nd all the patent pools that
are cited by a patent in k and consider the owners of these patents as incumbents to race k:
We proxy the value of these cited patents by the number of citations they receive, that is by
the citation count of the patents cited by a patent in pool k. To enrich our understanding of
the incumbency e ect, we distinguish the citations by vintages and include all vintages that
are at most 20 years old into our speci cation. In addition, we also aggregate the citation
counts of all vintages into an index for each rm in each race. Letting 0ik; 1ik; :::; 19ik
denote the number of citations received by all pools cited by pool k that belong to rm i
that are 0,1,..., up to 20 years old, we de ne the incumbency index of rm i in race k as
Iik =
19X
age=0
ageik  (20  age) : (10)
Finally, we include in all speci cations yearly dummies as controls. Yearly dummies cap-
ture exogenous aggregate changes in nancing conditions or additional changes in procedures
in the US Patent O ce.
3.4 Estimation and instruments
In order to estimate the parameters of the model in (8) by maximum likelihood, we need
to ensure that ik is uncorrelated with the observable characteristics. While experience and
the incumbency index are obviously given at the time the race starts, cash holdings are the
result of cash management and are therefore endogenous. To estimate W consistently, we
use a set of instruments for cash that are predetermined to the race, in order to rule out
any residual correlation between ik and the projection of cash on said instruments. We use
i) the logarithms of cash, total debt, total assets and sales two and three years before the
patent application ii) the averages of each of the previous variables for all the other rival
rms, j = i; in the same race iii) the average patenting experience for all other rival rms,
j = i; in the same race and iv) the average incumbency index per rm per vintage for all
other rival rms in the same race.
Following the literature on the demand for cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999 Almeida,
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et al. 2004), we use the lags of cash and total assets to capture cross-sectional di erences
in the levels of cash and the lags of sales and debt to capture cross-sectional di erences in
the changes in cash holdings. Following the new empirical industrial organization tradition,
we use the rivals experience and incumbency indices as measures of their expected activity
level in the race. Indeed, if cash is chosen to minimize the need for external nance and its
costs, then this choice will ultimately depend on the rivals average characteristics.
There is one major advantage from using as instruments measures of the competitiveness
of rivals in the race. While the rm s total cash holdings will be the sum of cash pledged to
each race the rm is simultaneouly in, the projection of the race-speci c characteristics of
rivals in race k on the total cash holdings will capture the component of total cash that the
rm pledges to race k only. Therefore, we can interpret our estimates of W as the sensitivity
of innovation to the cash pledged to the given race.
We estimate our model using a control function approach proposed by Petrin and Train
(2003, 2009). We cannot use standard instrumental variables techniques because the esti-
mation is non-linear. The estimation proceeds in two steps. In the rst step we estimate ik
with a rst stage regression of the endogenous variables on their instruments. In the second
stage we compute the maximum likelihood estimates of (9) after including the rst stage
residuals, ^ik; in the speci cation. Identi cation of W is achieved if the instruments pro-
vide enough exogenous variation in cash holdings: thus, the estimate ^ik will not be linearly
dependent on cash because, by construction, it is the residual of the regression of cash on
its instruments. Following also Petrin and Train (2003, 2009), we use a bootstrap estimator
for the parameter estimates standard errors.
The main comparative statics result of our theoretical model is that the winning prob-
ability of any rm in a given race should be positively associated with its own wealth and
negatively associated with any other rm s wealth. A rejection of the null hypothesis that
 = 0 implies that winning the race is determined jointly by all the competitors wealth
levels.
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4 Selecting the participants of a race
The remaining challenge is that, except for the winner, we do not observe which rms
participate in a race. We now address this problem. One possibility would be to include all
rms that are potentially in the race, e.g., all COMPUSTAT rms that typically le patents
of the same classi cation. This set is clearly too large to include and estimate equation (9)
by maximum likelihood. Therefore, we choose a subset of rms in addition to the winner
and estimate (9) for all rms in it.
There are various ways to choose the subset. McFadden (1978) has demonstrated that
the maximum likelihood estimator of the multinomial logit based only on a random selection
of xed size from the (large) universe of alternatives produces consistent estimates.13 While
easy to implement, this strategy carries the risk of including rms that may have decided
not to participate in the race after evaluating their chances given the competition. Indeed, it
does not exploit our model s prediction of which rms are most likely to race. According to
our model rms decide to enter the race only if their chances of winning the race conditional
on entry are su ciently high. Below we propose a selection of rms for the estimation based
precisely on that prediction. In unreported results, but available upon request, we show
that our method produces results in line with the random selection method, if not more
precisely estimated, and that our estimator satis es McFadden s (1978) su cient conditions
for consistency.
4.1 A useful distinction: incumbents versus newcomers
We nd it useful to partition, for any given patent, the set of all potential racing rms into
two sets depending on whether a rm owns prior technology that is cited by the patent or
not. We term the cited rms incumbents and the non-cited rms newcomers or entrants to
this particular race.14Formally, an incumbent is a rm with a strictly positive incumbency
index, an entrant has an incumbency index of zero.
The set of all cited rms is observable. Panel A of Table II shows that 95 of pools
of patents cite fewer than 10 rms (left column). Some of these citations are insigni cant
because they are too old or receive no citations themselves. The right column shows the
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cumulative relative contribution of each rm s incumbency index to the total incumbency
index of patent k: From (10) ; the total incumbency index is simply the sum of all rms
incumbency values, i.e., Ik =
P
i2NC
k
Iik: The cumulative incumbency index of the rst
four incumbents already concentrates an average 94 (median 100 ) of the patent s total
incumbency value. Therefore, the set of rms that have a signi cant incumbency stake in
race k is likely to be captured by the few rms that own the most often cited patents that
are cited by a patent in pool k. Hence, every selection of rms in the race will include the
four rms with the four highest citation counts of cited patents.
<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
4.2 Selecting the newcomers
We treat any rm that has won at least one Drug or Medical patent in the same ve-year
period the patent was awarded as a potential newcomer to each race. From this set we select
the rms that have - according to our model - the highest chances to win a race. To estimate
which rms have the highest chances of winning, we follow Berry s (1994) approach and
transform the non-linear MNL probabilities in (9) into a linear model.
Another way to understand equation (9) ; is to interpret the left-hand side as the aggregate
share of patents won by a given rm over a period of time t. Let C and NC be the sets
of rms cited and not cited by any patent at time t; respectively, where C NC :
Note that C is observable, while NC is not. Let sit be the share of patent pools that rm
i NC wins in period t. Let s0t be the share of patents won by any of the rms in
C in
period t: We demonstrate in the appendix that the logarithm of the relative share, sit
s0t
; can
be written as
ln sit   ln s0t = 0 + 
0
Y d+ 
0
WWit + EEit + 
0
it + 
0
CCit + it; (11)
where d is a vector of the four yearly dummy variables in each ve-year estimation sample.
This transformation is very intuitive. It says that the di erence between a non-cited rm s
share of patents won in a year relative to the share of patents won by the cited rms is
explained by the former rm s characteristics in the same period. This is simply because the
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set of cited rms, and hence their characteristics, are held constant by construction. Hence,
if we treat the unobservable it as the structural error of unobservable rm characteristics,
we can estimate the parameters, 0;Y ;W ; E and C from a regression of ln sit   ln s0t
onWit; Eit and Cit for all potential racing rms in t. Because cash holdings are likely to be
correlated with it; we use an instrumental variables estimator and the set of instruments
de ned above. Each estimation sample contains a panel of ve yearly patent shares cross-
sections of all non-cited rms, for each patent subclass and each quartile of the number of
citations received.15
This procedure assumes that any non-cited rm evaluates its chances for every race based
on its characteristics and all the others, using our model. Firms with a low rank drop out
of the race early enough, so that eventually the predicted equilibrium racing behavior is
driven by the characteristics of the subset of rms who have a fair chance, that is, whose
predicted probability of winning is positive. The main limitation of this approach is that
rms with little or no past success will be included in races they won, but not in races where
they lost despite having a good (unobservable) chance of winning. It is di cult to assess how
this possible omission a ects our results. On the one hand, we could be underestimating
the e ect of nancing constraints if these rms were also young and with limited access
to external nance. On the other hand, because it is likely that rms with good chances
eventually become winners, the risk of omission will be smaller for the late sample periods,
when these rms are more mature and their success is explained more by observable factors.
The approach has several virtues: (i) the dimensionality of the selection problem is trans-
formed into the number of cross-sectional units in the panel, so that we can use a very large
number of potential entrants every period (ii) we can use a straightforward instrumental
variables estimator to address the endogeneity ofW because the model is estimable by linear
methods (iii) because the dependent variable, ln sit   ln s0t; depends only on rm i s char-
acteristics, the instruments based on the characteristics of rm j = i automatically satisfy
the exclusion restriction and (iv) the dependent variable is by itself the score we use to rank
rms in terms of the likelihood of participating in each race. Indeed, the predicted di erence
ln sit   ln s0t ranks all rms active in t according to the probability that they might win
against a given set of cited rms. As we have shown above, the best response e ort level of
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a rm facing very aggressive rivals is zero, and it opts out of the race.
4.3 Selection stage results
We compute the score ^0 + ^
0
1d + ^
0
WWit 1 + ^EEit 1 + ^
0
CCit for all rms in t. This
score is the predicted probability that a rm wins a representative period t patent from
the set of all non cited rms. We rank rms according to their score within the year and
within the citation count quartile. We generate 285 rankings: one for each year (25 years),
subclass (between 2 and 3), and total citation count quartile. Panel B of Table II reports
the average cumulative scores for the top ranked rms. The predicted probability that the
winner is within the top ten rms, given that the winner is a non-cited rm, is on average
0.88 (median of 1). The winner is almost surely within the top fteen. Because there is little
gain, and large computational costs, to include more rms, we select the top ten rms to
be the set of non cited rms, NC ; that race for each patent pool in the same year, of the
same subclass, and in the same total citation count quartile. As a robustness check, we have
estimated the models that follow with fteen non-cited rms in the last ve year period and
have observed very similar results. They are available to the reader upon request. We note
too that our selection always includes the actual winner.
Based on our results above, we let the set k contain the four cited rms with the
highest incumbency index and the ten entrants with the highest estimated winning scores
in the same year, subclass, and total citation count quartile. Table III summarizes the main
characteristics of this selection. It shows that rms hold between 10 and 12 of their
assets in cash. While the proportion of cash to assets has not changed much over time, the
skewness of the distribution of cash across players has increased over time.
<INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE>
5 Estimates of the racing model
This section describes our results from estimating the parameters in (9), using the set of 14
pre-selected rms (four from the citations list, ten from the non-cited set). The estimates
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are obtained by maximum likelihood, and Petrin and Train s (2003, 2009) control function
method to instrument for endogenous cash holdings.
5.1 Internal nance
Our model predicts that the probability that a rm wins an average patent in each period-
category-citation count cluster depends positively on the rm s own cash holdings and neg-
atively on the competitors , i.e., that W > 0. Table IV con rms that prediction for all
pools of patents in the three upper quartiles of citation counts as from 1985, and before
that, for the pools in the fourth quartile of citation counts. The lack of signi cance in most
estimation clusters before 1985 must be interpreted with caution: those years concentrate
many more patents that receive relatively few citations, where it is less likely that the pools
constructed e ectively represent a technology race. As the patenting activity increases, and
the patents adjusted number of citations becomes larger this source of noise should become
less important. Indeed, after 1985, we nd a signi cant e ect of cash holdings on the winning
probability in all except the lowest citation count quartile.
<INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE>
Patenting experience has a positive and signi cant e ect in all cases, in line with our
expectations. There is no clear pattern regarding the e ect of the cited patents citation
counts. Whenever the e ect is signi cant, the more valuable the rm s one year old or
younger patents are, the less likely it is the rm wins the next race. We nd an opposing
e ect for patents between 2 to 5 years in some cases. This is in line with an ambiguous e ect
of the same variable in our theoretical model. On the one hand, the rm is less nancially
constrained the more valuable the patents the rm currently owns. On the other hand,
the more valuable the previous patents the smaller the incentive of a rm to make these
patents obsolete by inventing new products. In addition to these e ects that are present
in our theory, there are also experience e ects: previous innovations may create better
technological opportunities to the previous winners (incumbents) than to the previous losers
(entrants). We believe that our estimates are more likely to capture the rst two e ects.
Indeed, the citation count coe cient will capture technological opportunity only to the
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extent that it favours one type of rm more than the other because the left hand side of
(8) is the probability of winning conditional on the fact that there is a winner. Hence, the
component of technological opportunity common to all players cancels out. Further, some
of the advantageous e ects of technological opportunity through incumbency may disappear
through the public disclosure of the new technology after the patent is announced.
Note that the rst stage error component is signi cant almost everywhere. This implies
that our rst stage control function approach has e ectively captured some of the important
correlated unobservable components.
5.2 Internal vs. External Finance
Our model implies also that, given a level of cash, the rm s borrowing capacity should
increase its probability of winning a patent pool and decrease that of its rivals. Table
V shows the results of adding the logarithm of the total value of assets to our previous
speci cation. The predicted e ect is present in all top three citations quartiles since 1985,
and in the fourth quartile since 1975. Moreover, the e ect of cash has strengthened with
respect to the previous speci cation.
<INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE>
To interpret the economic signi cance of these coe cients, we have computed the pre-
dicted change in the probability of winning a patent pool with respect to an increase in
one standard deviation about the mean of cash, total assets or patenting experience. Both
cash and total assets have an economically signi cant e ect on the winning probability. For
example, between 1995 and 1999, a rm won a race for a patent pool in the highest citation
count quartile with an average probability of 0.08 an increase of a one standard deviation
amount of cash would have increased this probability by 0.047, that is by almost 60 . A
similar increase in the amount of total assets would have doubled its chances. The winning
probability is in general more sensitive to assets than to cash. This con rms our earlier
point that COMPUSTAT rms have already been successful in obtaining external nance.
Notably, the sensitivity of innovation to experience looks steady over time but in the case of
cash and total assets, this sensitivity has increased.
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<INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE>
Table A.II in the appendix, serves as a useful benchmark to compare the e ects of our
instruments on the estimates of the sensitivity of innovation to cash. Panel B shows the
standard maximum likelihood estimates of (9), that is without instruments, for the same
speci cation reported in Table V. The estimates without instruments slightly overestimate
the sensitivity of cash. It seems therefore that, within the set of selected rms, the unobserv-
able rm characteristics that make a racing rm more competitive may be positively, but
weakly, correlated with total cash. Panel A shows that the OLS estimates of the selection
stage underestimate the patenting sensitivity to cash with respect to the IV estimates (Table
A.I).
6 Evidence from R&D data
6.1 Method
Our model also has implications about the R D intensity chosen by all rms in a race.
Indeed, rms choose the hazard rate indirectly through their R D expenditures. Provided
that this mapping is one to one, the comparative statics of the rm s winning probability
with respect to changes in its characteristics are identical to the comparative statics of R D
with respect to changes in the rm s characteristics. Under the null hypothesis that the
rms engage in a race, R D is determined in a system of equations like (7) where R D is
the dependent variable. As a result, the correlation of R D levels across players within the
same race should be di erent from zero. We test these comparative statics by treating each
race as a panel unit, k; where the observations in each unit are the rms in the race, i.e., all
i k: The regression model we use is
lnR&Dik = 
0
WWik + EEik + 
0
ik + 
0
CCik + ik + k + uik;
where the k is the component in R D that is common to all rms racing for the same pool
of patents. We estimate k as a random or a xed e ect, and compute the proportion of the
variation in individual R D that it is attributed to this e ect. We also use an instrumental
variables panel estimator, to account for the endogeneity of cash holdings, which are speci ed
inWik:
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Cockburn and Henderson (1994) estimate the same model with project-speci c data from
a survey of ten large rms in the pharmaceutical industry and could not reject that k = 0.
While their level of disaggregation is ideal, the limited coverage of rms may have missed
potentially important correlations between the R D expenditures of smaller entrants and
the large rms. The di erence here is that, as we have shown above, we devise a procedure
that selects the rms most likely to be in k from the universe of publicly traded rms who
have led at least one pharmaceutical patent. While here we measures k as the correlation
in aggregate R D, we note that this correlation is (i) over and above the common time
e ects and (ii) between rms that we identify as being in that particular race only. For any
two rms i; j that have at least one race in common, a necessary condition for the residual
correlation between their aggregate R D levels to be zero is that the correlation between
R D at every race the two overlap is zero. Therefore, rejection of this hypothesis implies
that there is at least one race where they race against each other and where their R D is
correlated.
Table VII displays our results for the periods of 1990 to 1994 and 1995 to 1999. We
report the e cient, random e ect estimates whenever we cannot reject that the estimator
is consistent. Otherwise, we report the xed e ects estimator. COMPUSTAT coverage for
R D intensity in the early sample is limited, resulting in a signi cant loss of observations.
We omit these results here. They are available to the reader upon request.
6.2 Results
Our estimates imply that an increase in the logarithm of the rm s cash holdings or an
increase in the logarithm of total assets are associated with a signi cant increase in the
logarithm of R D (Table VII). These estimates can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
Because the instruments for cash holdings are based on the measures of competitiveness of
the rms rivals in that given race, the coe cient of cash measures the conditional covariance
between rm-level R D and cash holdings at the race level. The most striking result is the
sharp increase in the sensitivity of R D with respect to own cash holdings: a doubling of
cash holdings increases total rm R D by at most 43 between 1990 and 1994. Between
1995 and 1999 a 100 increase in cash holdings doubles the total level of R D.
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<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
While the dependent variable is rm-level R D, our panel unit is race-speci c. Therefore,
once the set of rms in a race is de ned, we are able to measure the race-speci c R D
component, k: Our results show that this component is very important: for patent pools in
the upper half of the distribution of total citations received, the variation in the estimated
common race component explains between 7.4 and up to 47 of the total variation in total
rm R D explained by the model. This novel result must be interpreted with caution. Our
estimate of k is only accurate to the extent that our selection of rms considered as rivals in
the same race is precise. Because our method tends to select either (i) rms that have been
most successful in the given patent subclass or (ii) rms whose patents have been heavily
cited, a more accurate interpretation of our evidence is that the R D intensity of rms that
have been successfully patenting in the same line of technology is highly correlated.
7 Discussion
The empirical analysis above has shown that the cross-sectional variation in the ratio of
cash holdings to total assets of publicly traded rms is a powerful determinant of the cross-
sectional variation in the probability of winning drugs and medical patents. We have iden-
ti ed this e ect through the comparison of success rates across races and across incumbents
and entrants to these races. Therefore, innovative success depends on how much more cash
the rm has relative to its rivals.
The theoretical relationship tested by this data is itself very robust. Indeed, the empirical
speci cation is derived directly from a Nash equilibrium where rms are optimally nanced
at any point on their best-response function. This feature distinguishes our approach from
others in the literature that analyze best-response behavior keeping the nancing contract
xed as the nancing needs of the rm change (e.g., Chevalier, 1995 ensen and Showalter
2004).
Our model distinguishes rms in an industry in terms of their technological standing.
The empirical analysis isolates the e ects of patenting experience from those of incumbency
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by counting separately the cited and non-cited patents the rm has accumulated. We have
shown that incumbents keep on innovating more often the more valuable their cited patents
of age below two years are and the less valuable their older cited patents are (as measured
by the number of citations these patents receive).
We end with an account of what we feel are limitations of our work. Our theory is arguably
simple compared to the complexity of the rms in our sample. We are con dent that a more
complex theory would share the same comparative statics features, but we leave a detailed
analysis of this case to future work. Our empirical analysis is based on our predictions of
which rms will be in the race rather than actual data on whether they are in it or not.
Future research could focus on collecting a comprehensive data set on project speci c data.
Another important step in this line of research is to repeat our exercise for the case of private
rms. This paper identi es powerful e ects of cash di erences across COMPUSTAT rms
only. While it is di cult to generalize our empirical results to private rms and startups,
we would conjecture that nancing constraints have an even more pronounced e ect on the
behavior of these rms.
Finally, we study sequences of races but not the evolution of particular rms within the
industry. A further interesting question for future research is how the nancing constraints
of rms evolve over time as they accumulate patents and how this a ects the dynamics of
industry structure. We pursue these questions in ongoing research.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Lemma 1 i) The rst-best level of e¤ort is implementable if and only if
hV  i +i
h+r
F  Wi:
ii) A second best contract takes the form si
 
1; 1; s+i

for some s+i [0; 1) :
Proof of Lemma 1. i) Let Vi (h) be the rst-best value of rm i. Vi (h) is de ned by
the asset equation
rVi (h) dt = max
ai

ai
 
V +i   Vi (h)

+ h
 
V  i   VI (h)

+ i   ai
	
dt:
The problem on the right hand side of this asset equation is a strictly concave in aI : The
rst-order condition is
a 1i
 
V +i   Vi (h)

= 1; (12)
If we multiply both sides of (12) by ai ; and substitute the resulting equality into the asset
equation, we can solve for the value of the rm:
Vi (h) =
(1  ) ai V
+
i + hV
 
i + i
(1  ) ai + h+ r
: (13)
Substituting back into equation (12); we observe that ai is the unique solution to the equation

 
(h+ r)V +i  
 
hV  i + i

= a1 i ((1  ) a

i + h+ r) (14)
With nancing, the asset equation takes the form
rVi ( ) dt = max
ai

ai
  
1  s+i

V +i   Vi ( )

+ h
  
1  s i

V  i   Vi ( )

+ (1  si) i   ai
	
dt:
(15)
Let si
 
si; s
 
i ; s
+
i

: Since the right-hand-side of the asset equation is strictly concave in ai;
a solution to (15) must satisfy the rst-order condition
ai (si)
 1  (1  s+i )V +i   Vi ( ) = 1: (16)
Multiplying condition (16) on both sides by ai (si) and substituting the resulting expression
into (15) we solve for the value of the rm s claim
Vi (h; si) =
(1  ) ai (si)

 
1  s+i

V +i + h
 
1  s i

V  i + (1  si) i
(1  ) ai (si)
 + h+ r
: (17)
In addition, investors must break even. Formally, it must be true that
ai (si)

s+i V
+
i + hs
 
i V
 
i + sii
ai (si)
 + h+ r
= F  Wi: (18)
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An optimal contract maximizes (17) subject to (18) and (16) :
We now show that a contract implementing the rst-best level of e ort provision is feasible
if and only if
hV  i + i
h+ r
F  Wi:
The rst-best is feasible if and only if there exists a contract that allows investors to break
even, and, at the same time, does not distort the marginal incentive to provide e ort in
research. That is, the di erences in values on the left hand side of conditions (12) and (16)
must be identical:  
1  s+i

V +i   Vi (h; si) = V
+
i   Vi (h) :
Substituting from equations (17) and (13) we obtain
 
1  s+i

V +i  
(1  ) ai (si)

 
1  s+i

V +i + h
 
1  s i

V  i + (1  si) i
(1  ) ai (si)
 + h+ r
= V +i  
(1  ) ai V
+
i + hV
 
i + i
(1  ) ai + h+ r
:
Clearly, by the de nition of rst-best, ai = ai (si) : Exploiting this fact we can simplify the
condition on the equality of margins to the following simple condition
hs i V
 
i + sii = s
+
i V
+
i (h+ r) : (19)
In addition, investors must break even, i.e., condition (18) must be respected. Substituting
condition (19) into condition (18) we obtain the relation
s+i V
+
i = F  Wi: (20)
Substituting condition (20) back into condition (19) we obtain
hs i V
 
i + sii
h+ r
= F  Wi: (21)
The rst-best is thus feasible if and only if we are able to nd nonnegative numbers si = 
si; s
 
i ; s
+
i

smaller or equal to one that satisfy conditions (20) and (21) : If Wi 0 and
V +i > F then it is always possible to nd a s
+
i < 1 such that s
+
i V
+
i = F   Wi: Hence
condition (21) is the crucial one. We can nd numbers s i and si both smaller or equal to
one that satisfy the implementability condition if and only if
hV  i + 
h+ r
F  Wi: (22)
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The derivative of the left-hand side of inequality (22) with respect to h is equal to
V  i r i
(h+r)2
;
which is negative. Since the left-hand side tends to zero as h tends to in nity, there exists a
strictly positive value of h
FB
such that (22) holds with equality if and only if i
r
> F  Wi:
In that case h
FB
is de ned by the condition
hV  i + i
h+ r

h=h
FB
= F  Wi:
ii) follows directly from (21) and (22) :
Proof of Proposition 1. ii) is a direct consequence of the Lemma above hence it
su ces to prove i). An equilibrium satis es the condition
ai = bi (bj (ai;Wj; ) ;Wi; )
Di erentiating totally with respect to aj , Wi; and Wj; we get
1 
@bi
@aj
@bj
@ai

dai =
@bi
@aj
@bj
@Wj
dWj +
@bi
@Wi
dWi
Setting dWi and dWj; respectively, equal to zero we nd
dai
dWi
=
@bi
@Wi
1  @bi
@aj
@bj
@ai
 (23)
and
dai
dWj
=
@bi
@aj
@bj
@Wj
1  @bi
@aj
@bj
@ai
 (24)
By the fact that
dbi(aj ;Wi;)daj  < 1 for i = 1; 2 and j = i; the denominators in these expressions
are positive, and since @bi
@Wi
> 0 for i = 1; 2 it follows that
dai
dWi
> 0: Switching indices, (24)
gives an expression for
daj
dWi
: In particular, we have
daj
dWi
=
@bj
@ai
@bi
@Wi
1 
@bj
@ai
@bi
@aj
 : Since
dbj(ai;Wj ;)dai  < 1;
we have
daj
dWi
<
dai
dWi
:
Proof of Proposition 2. The probability that rm i wins the race is equal to the
probability that rm i s rst innovation arrives before rm j s rst innovation. The
arrival times follow independent Poisson distributions with hazard rates ai and a

j , re-
spectively. So the arrival time of the rst innovation has probability distribution function
1  exp ( ai t) for i = 1; 2: Hence, the probability that rm i innovates rst isZ 1
0
ai exp ( a

i t)
 
1 
 
1  exp
 
 aj t

dt =
ai
ai + a

j
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Di erentiating
ai
ai +a

j
with respect to Wi we obtain
@
@Wi
ai
ai + a

j
=
a 1i
 
ai + a

j
 dai
dWi
 

a 1i
dai
dWi
+ a 1j
daj
dWi

ai 
ai + a

j
2
=
ai a

j 
ai + a

j
2
0
@ daidWi
ai
 
daj
dWi
aj
1
A
So, we have @
@Wi
ai
ai +a

j
> 0 i
dai
dWi
>
ai
aj
daj
dWi
: Cancelling terms on both sides this is equivalent
to
aj
ai
>
@bj
@ai
(ai ;Wj; ) : We now show that this condition is indeed veri ed: applying the
implicit function theorem to condition (6) ; we have
daj
dai
=
 

 
V  j   (F  Wj)

(ai + r) + 
 
aj V
+
j + a

i V
 
j + j  
 
aj + a

i + r

(F  Wj)

  aj

a 1i
 
 
2a 1j
 
V +j   (F  Wj)

(ai + r) 
 
(1  2) aj + a

i + r

(25)
Using condition (6) (and some straightforward manipulations) to simplify expression (25)
we obtain
daj
dai
=
ai
ai + r
aj
ai
 :
where
 
 

 
V  j   (F  Wj)

(ai + r) + 
 
aj V
+
j + a

i V
 
j + j  
 
aj + a

i + r

(F  Wj)

  aj

 

aj
 
V +j   (F  Wj)

 
aj((1 2)aj +ai +r)
(ai +r)

Since
ai
ai +r
< 1; we have
aj
ai
>
@bj
@ai
(ai ;Wj; ) if   < 1: Using (6) again, and simplifying terms,
we nd   < 1 if and only if 

 
V  j   (F  Wj)

(ai + r)

<
 
a^j (1  )V
+
j + a

i V
 
j + j  
 
a^j (1  ) + a

i + r

(F  Wj)

:
From (6) one can verify that the right-hand side of this expression is positive. The left-hand
side must be negative. If it were positive, then rst-best nancing would be possible, because
the value of a losing rm would be su cient to cover the cost of the investment. Hence, we
have shown that
aj
ai
>
@bj
@ai
(ai ;Wj; ) :
Likewise, @
@Wj
ai
ai +a

j
< 0 i aj
dai
dWj
< ai
daj
dWj
; which is after cancelling terms, equivalent to
@bi
@aj
<
ai
aj
: Up to an interchange of indices, exactly the same argument as given above can be
used to show that indeed @bi
@aj
<
ai
aj
; this is omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the set of rms as = 1; 2; :::; n and its partition
i; i : Consider rst any rm j i: Let ~h =
X
k 6=j
ak : From (14) ; we can write rm
j s best reply as the solution to the equation
aj

~h+ r

V + = aj

(1  ) aj +
~h+ r

;
where we have used V  j = j = 0: Imposing symmetry among rms j i; we can write
~h = (n  2) aj + a

i :
Substituting back, we obtain
aj
 
(n  2) aj + a

i + r

V + = aj
 
(n  1  ) aj + a

i + r

:
Changing variables to h (n  1) aj and rearranging; we can write

h
n  1

n  2
n  1
h + ai + r

V +  

h
n  1
 1


n  1  
n  1
h + ai + r

= 0; (26)
which corresponds to the best response function of the set of rms j i: Denote the
solution of this function for given ai as ~b (ai) :
Firm i s best reply is still given by (6)

 
ai V
+
i + hV
 
i + i   (a

i + h+ r) (F  Wi)

(h+ r)  ai ((1  ) a

i + h+ r) = 0:
(27)
The solution to this equation is denoted bi (h;Wi) :
To prove our result, we need to show that
@
@Wi
ai
ai + h

=
ai h
 
ai + a

j
2
 
dai
dWi
ai
 
dh
dWi
h
!
> 0
From the equilibrium condition, ai = bi

~b (ai ) ;Wi

we get
dai
dWi
=
@bi
@Wi
1 
@bi
@h
@~b
@ai
 and from h =
~b (bi (h
;Wi)) we get
dh
dWi
=
@~b
@ai
@bi
@Wi
1 
@bi
@h
@~b
@ai
 : Stability implies that @bi
@h
@~b
@ai
< 1: So,
dai
dWi
ai
 
dh
dWi
h
> 0
if and only if @
~b
@ai
< h

ai
: By straightforward calculus, we have
dh
dai
=
h
2 h

n 1
a 1i V
+   a 1i
 
h
n 1
 1

i
 
h

n 1
 
2n 2
n 1
h + ai + r

V +  
 
1
n 1
 1
 1

h
1 

 
n 1 
n 1
h + ai + r

 
 
h
n 1
 1
 n 1 
n 1
i
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By a similar reasoning as for the case of two rms, the denominator is positive. Using this
insight, and condition (26) one can show that @
~b
@ai
< h

ai
if and only if
  
h
n  1
rV + + 

h
n  1
 1

r < (1  )

h
n  1
 1


n  1  
n  1
h + ai + r

(28)
The right-hand side of (28) is positive so we need to show that the left-hand side is negative.
This is the case if and only if 
h
n  1
 1

V + > 1
Substituting for h

n 1
= aj ; this is equivalent to
a 1j V
+ > 1:
Let V

~h

denote the value of rm j before the innovation is found. From the rst-order
condition of rm j; (12) ; we know that
a 1j V
+ =
1

+ a 1j V

~h

> 1;
which proves the proposition.
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Appendix 2: Selection of Entrants
Derivation of Equation (11). From (9) de ne
sit
exp(
0
WWit + EEit + 
0
it + 
0
CCit + it)P
j2N exp(
0
WWjt + EEjt + 
0
jt + 
0
CCjt + jt)
and
s0t
P
h2NC exp(
0
WWht + EEht + 
0
ht + 
0
CCht + ht)P
j2N exp(
0
WWjt + EEjt + 
0
jt + 
0
CCjt + jt)
Taking logarithms and subtracting we obtain
ln sit   ln s0t = 
0
WWit + EEit + 
0
it + 
0
CCit + it
  ln
X
j2N
exp(
0
WWjt + EEjt + 
0
jt + 
0
CCjt + jt)
  ln
X
h2NC
exp(
0
WWht + EEht + 
0
ht + 
0
CCht + ht)
+ ln
X
j2N
exp(
0
WWjt + EEjt + 
0
jt + 
0
CCjt + jt):
Note that 0it = 0 for all i
NC : Note too that the second and fourth term cancel out,
and that the third term, ln
P
j2NC exp(:); is constant across i and varies only across time.
Hence, this term can be written as a constant plus yearly dummies, simplifying the model
to expression (11) :
<INSERT TABLE A.I ABOUT HERE>
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Footnotes
1. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show that incumbents can preempt entrants from racing for incremental
innovations if the incumbent bene ts more from persisting as a monopolist than the entrant from
coexisting as a duopolist. Reinganum (1983) shows how this result is reversed if innovation is stochastic:
incumbent  rms will have less incentives to innovate than entrants because additional investments in
RD will only speed up the erosion of their own current monopoly pro ts.
2. It is widely acknowledged that  rms in most other industries use other mechanisms to protect the
competitive advantages of RD (e.g., superior marketing, customer service, client switching costs) and
in these industries patent records are not a good indicator for innovations and the races for them.
Despite our focus on pharmaceutical patents, our method can be directly applied to any race in any
industry provided that a satisfactory measure of success is available.
3. The authors state that the  rms they sample account for approximately 25 to 30 of the worldwide sales
and RD of the Ethical Drugs Industry and claim that these  rms are not markedly unrepresentative
of the industry in terms of size, or of technical and commercial performance.
4. Note that this result is diametrically opposed to the results of Blundell, et al. (1999): technology
laggards have more incentives to innovate because, unlike leaders, their innovative eorts do not erode
the po ts of shelvcurrent innovations.
5. Another advantage of our approach is that we do not have to control for technological opportunity.
Since we focus on races that have actually occurred and been won by someone, our observations are
conditional on there being a technological opportunity to explore.
6. We could allow for a technology where the hazard rate is f(ai; ki), where ki is a variable investment
complementary to eort. However, this introduces further technical complications without adding
insights.
7. This formulation gives all the bargaining power to the  rm. This is not crucial; all our results go
through if the investor has all the bargaining power, or for any linear surplus sharing rule between
investor and  rm.
8. The extension to the case of an arbitrary number of  rms could be done along the lines suggested by
Dixit (1986).
9. Additional evidence suggesting the use of patent citations as a measure of private value is provided by
Hall, J	e, and Trajtenberg (2005), who show that an extra citation per patent is on average associated
with a 3

increase in the  r
s market value. The citation count has been traditionally used as a
measure of the social value of a patent (e.g., Trajtenberg 1990).
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10. Hall (2003) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that a pharmaceutical patent is clearly linked to a
unique, new, chemical composition. Therefore, it clearly dnes a potential new product market. As
a result, Kremer (1998) singles out pharmaceutical patents as the ideal candidate for social welfare
maximizing patent buy-outs. Bessen and Hunt (2003) show that the pharmaceutical industry is the
only industry where the propensity to patent is insensitive to time variation in the US Patent O¢ cs
patenting standards. Their interpretation is that an easier approval of patents creates incentives to
le patents that increase the s litigation bargaining power and not to le patents that block
imitation. Because pharmaceutical rms typically dt accumulate patents for reasons other than to
block imitation, their patenting intensity does not react to changes in the patenting standards.
11. Bronwyn Halls webpage [ttp://lerkeley.edu/ bhhall//h.hlt provides the code
that corrects any misspelling by the USPTO of the assigns names. This code enhances the matching
of the NBER to COMPUSTAT by company name and CUSIP in the NBER database signicantly.
12. E.g., our sample includes all patents awarded to rms such as Hoechst, Hman-LaRoche, Pzer,
Schering, Ciba, among others.
13. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this result to us.
14. Note that an entrant may be an existing rm in the industry that has so far not obtained any patents
in this particular category, but potentially many patents in other categories.
15. A summary of the results of this step is included Table A.I. All estimations also include dummy
variables for each year, and Cik includes 2-digit SIC code xed eects. We show there the elasticities
implied by the estimates. The full details of the results are available upon request.
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Table I: Summary of the Patents in the NBER Database Before and After the Match to COMPUSTAT
This table summarizes the main characteristics of all US patents in the NBER Database between 1975 and 1999, in the
technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. It shows the results of matching the awarded
patents, or pools of such patents, to their citations and to their assignees   nancial data in COMPUSTAT. A patent pool
groups all patents awarded to the same  rm that were  led in the same week. All citation counts are corrected for yearly
di¤ erences in the propensity to cite using the adjustment factors provided by Hall et al. (2002). The concentration index
is the sum of the squares of the relative contribution of each patent s number of citations to the total number of citations
received by all patents in the same pool.
Panel A: Citations received by patents matched and not matched to COMPUSTAT
Number of Standard First Third
Observations Mean deviation Minimum quartile Median quartile Maximum
All patents in NBER 91; 656 0:753 2:534 0 0 0:216 0:810 150
All patents owned by corporations (A) 77; 704 0:754 2:495 0 0 0:217 0:793 150
Patents where CUSIP is available (B) 31; 039 0:825 2:390 0 0 0:296 0:917 150
Panel B: Summary of patent pools matched and not matched to COMPUSTAT
Number of Standard First Third
Observations Mean deviation Minimum quartile Median quartile Maximum
Number of patents in the pool
All pools owned owned by corporations (A) 37; 283 2:101 3:356 1 1 1 2 50
Pools where CUSIP is available (B) 8; 399 3:696 5:480 1 1 2 4 50
Total citations received by the pool
All pools owned by corporations (A) 37; 283 1:583 4:414 0 0 0:432 1:479 162
Pools where CUSIP is available (B) 8; 399 3:049 6:396 0 0:298 1:064 3:030 162
Within-pool citations concentration
All pools owned by corporations (A) 37; 283 0:586 0:451 0 0 0:901 1 1
Pools where CUSIP is available (B) 8; 399 0:634 0:389 0 0:284 0:722 1 1
All pools with at least one citation (A) 11; 769 0:740 0:310 0:057 0:479 1: 1 1
All pools with at least one citation, with
available CUSIP (B)
7; 187 0:741 0:313 0:057 0:484 1 1 1
Patent pools accumulated by the winner
All pools owned by corporations (A) 37; 283 43:667 124:751 1 2 7 28 1936
Pools where CUSIP is available (B) 8; 399 100:971 202:935 1 7 27 89 1936
a Estimates followed by ,  and  indicate that the p-value for the di ﬀ erences of means test between groups A and B are statistically di ﬀ erent
from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi ﬁ cance levels, respectively.
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Table II: Selection of Firms Competing in a Patent Race
This table describes the statistic of the selection of cited and non-cited ﬂrms for every
patent race. All COMPUSTAT ﬂrms that have won a patent in each ﬂve year period
are ranked each year by their predicted probability of winning a patent pool of a given
patent subclass in a given quartile of the number of citations received. The probability is
predicted using the model and the estimates in Table A.I. If a patent in the pool, k, cites
a patent in pool, l, which by ﬂrm i, then the citations count of all patents cited by k is
given by the weighted average, Ik,
Ik =
P
8 i
P
8l cited by k
owned by i
#(citationsof) (20  agel) ;
where l is at most 20 years old and has been itself cited #(citationsl) times. Each cited
ﬂrmﬃs relative contribution to Ik is given by
P
8l cited by k
owned by i
#(citationsl)(20 agel)
Ik
:
All citation counts are corrected for yearly dierences in the propensity to cite using the
adjustment factors provided by Hall et al. (2002).
Panel A: Universe of cited rms
Number of patent pools = 37,283
Number of ﬂrms cited by
patent pool
Relative contribution of the n-th or
better ranked ﬂrm to the index, Ik
Cumulative Top n ﬂrms, by
Number frequency citations index Mean Median
1 23.21 1 0.659 0.659
2 42.54 2 0.837 0.939
3 57.04 3 0.906 1.000
4 74.15 4 0.939 1.000
5 81.21 5 0.958 1.000
10 95.60 10 0.983 1.000
Panel B: Selection of non-cited rms
Number of selections = 285
Predicted probability that the winner is the n-th or
higher ranked non-cited ﬂrm, given that a non-cited
ﬂrm wins
Top n ﬂrms, by Mean Median
winning probability probability probability
1 0.399 0.293
5 0.755 0.999
10 0.884 1.000
15 0.909 1.000
20 0.916 1.000
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Table III: Summary Statistics of the Selection
This table summarizes the main characteristics of the  rms selected as the most likely participants in every given race. The selection includes
the  rms that own the four most valuable cited patent pools portfolios, and the ten  rms most likely to win any given pool each year, from
among the set of all non-cited  rms. The probabilities of winning a pool each year are predicted using the model and the estimates reported
in Table A.I.
Number of Standard First Third
Observations Mean deviation Minimum quartile Median quartile Maximum
Sample Period: 1975 to 1979
Cash holdings, 1 year before the  ling date
( $ Millions)
6; 840 306:12 1; 449:31 1:27 37:33 97:00 212:87 15; 328:79
Total assets, 2 years before the  ling date ( $
Millions)
6; 840 2; 523:33 6; 053:10 6:04 398:17 1; 041:26 1; 993:39 52; 557:91
Patent pools accumulated, up to 1 year be-
fore the  ling date
6; 840 0:09 0:45 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:07 14:15
Sample Period: 1980 to 1984
Cash holdings, 1 year before the  ling date
( $ Millions)
5; 832 375:30 1; 529:46 0:01 38:28 119:05 317:37 15; 328:79
Total assets, 2 years before the  ling date ( $
Millions)
5; 832 3; 810:99 7; 034:68 4:64 369:63 1; 511:20 3; 609:60 52; 557:91
Patent pools accumulated, up to 1 year be-
fore the  ling date
5; 832 0:27 1:14 0:00 0:00 0:05 0:21 18:64
Sample Period: 1985 to 1989
Cash holdings, 1 year before the  ling date
( $ Millions)
7; 354 544:70 1; 859:46 0:11 29:77 110:44 472:00 15; 328:79
Total assets, 2 years before the  ling date ( $
Millions)
7; 354 4; 661:38 9; 021:03 3:39 202:50 1; 208:51 5; 095:10 66; 710:02
Patent pools accumulated, up to 1 year be-
fore the  ling date
7; 354 0:36 1:90 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:18 36:61
Sample Period: 1990 to 1994
Cash holdings, 1 year before the  ling date
( $ Millions)
9; 801 616:65 1; 542:21 0:17 51:81 153:70 671:71 20; 760:20
Total assets, 2 years before the  ling date ( $
Millions)
9; 801 7; 360:02 10; 981:54 6:59 573:84 3; 599:61 9; 215:00 98; 627:88
Patent pools accumulated, up to 1 year be-
fore the  ling date
9; 801 0:54 2:68 0:00 0:01 0:07 0:25 44:79
Sample Period: 1995 to 1999
Cash holdings, 1 year before the  ling date
( $ Millions)
15; 231 1; 161:05 2; 084:02 0:01 92:60 410:85 1; 794:00 24; 760:89
Total assets, 2 years before the  ling date ( $
Millions)
15; 231 10; 787:12 12; 540:87 8:02 1; 688:67 6; 340:30 16; 012:07 102; 714:00
Patent pools accumulated, up to 1 year be-
fore the  ling date
15; 231 1:81 9:39 0:00 0:04 0:25 0:49 171:20
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Table IV: Estimates of the Model of a Patent Race Winner
This table shows the parameter estimates of the model that selects the winner of each patent pool from the set of pre-selected competitors. The estimates
were computed by maximum likelihood and Petrin and Train ! s (2003) method to instrument endogenous regressors in the multinomial logit setup. The
estimable model is
Pr(" rmi wins race k) =
exp(0xik + ik)P
j exp(
0
xjk + jk)
:
where the regressors are listed below, and ik represents the unobserved " rm characteristics that are correlated with cash. The instruments for cash holdings
are the two and three year lags of the logarithm of cash, sales, total assets and outstanding debt, and the averages of cash, sales, debt and accumulated
patent pools of all other rival " rms in the same race. The standard errors of the parameter estimates are computed using a bootstrap estimator. They are
shown in brackets underneath the parameter estimate.a The estimation uses all US patent pools won by COMPUSTAT " rms from 1975 to 1999, in the
techonological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patent pools are classi " ed into quartiles according to the number of citations
received. The number of citations is adjusted for time di # erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall et al. (2002).
Estimation Period: 1975 to 1979 Estimation Period: 1980 to 1984 Estimation Period: 1985 to 1989
Patent Citations Q uartiles Patent Citations Q uartiles Patent Citations Q uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings,  0:383 0:063 0:148 0:261 0:029 0:220 0:047 0:270 0:078 0:324 0:188 0:236
1 year before the " ling date (0:105) (0:090) (0:146) (0:091) (0:080) (0:119) (0:133) (0:108) (0:092) (0:082) (0:091) (0:068)
Total patent pools accumulated, 0:567 0:548 0:364 0:498 0:188 0:166 0:226 0:252 0:091 0:084 0:108 0:134
up to 1 year before the " ling date (0:322) (0:117) (0:162) (0:082) (0:043) (0:039) (0:044) (0:043) (0:027) (0:021) (0:017) (0:021)
Citations count of citations, by vintages:
Age < 1  0:794  1:149  0:393  0:063  26:130 0:935  0:193  0:523  0:888  0:066  0:153  0:108
(0:515) (0:796) (0:214) (0:032) (2:566) (0:590) (0:104) (0:166) (0:412) (0:078) (0:093) (0:052)
1  Age < 2 0:053 0:027 0:008 0:074 1:154 0:037 0:37 0:159 0:317 0:056 0:246 0:019
(0:037) (0:022) (0:031) (0:022) (0:194) (0:171) (0:290) (0:070) (0:281) (0:093) (0:099) (0:015)
2  Age < 3  8:053  0:147  0:112 0:008 0:027 0:648 0:14 0:433 0:575 0:344  0:038 0:114
(0:309) (0:123) (0:044) (0:009) (0:182) (0:290) (0:190) (0:116) (0:922) (0:121) (0:070) (0:037)
3  Age < 4 0:021 0:004  0:314 0:028  1:725 0:032 0:030 0:086  0:147  0:09 0:06 0:062
(0:051) (0:035) (0:182) (0:017) (0:598) (0:065) (0:053) (0:039) (0:220) (0:168) (0:110) (0:042)
4  Age < 5 0:022 0:006 0:004 0:030 0:060  0:352  0:096 0:093  0:005 0:044 0:046 0:058
(0:030) (0:011) (0:015) (0:011) (0:092) (0:417) (0:125) (0:097) (0:202) (0:073) (0:069) (0:035)
5  Age < 10 0:022  0:032  0:084  0:013 0  0:024 0:004  0:007  0:205 0:018 0:012  0:005
(0:031) (0:022) (0:040) (0:009) (0:018) (0:025) (0:007) (0:007) (0:105) (0:062) (0:039) (0:027)
10  Age < 20  10:734 11:203 11:879 11:803  0:438 0:006  0:004  0:012 0:014 0:091 0:001  0:011
(1:370) (0:717) (0:598) (0:632) (0:107) (0:003) (0:010) (0:012) (0:004) (0:043) (0:007) (0:016)
First stage error (^ik) 0:657
  0:138  0:353  0:655 0:401 0:150 0:512 0:632 0:046  0:203 0:285  0:422
(0:187) (0:142) (0:195) (0:101) (0:167) (0:175) (0:166) (0:134) (0:117) (0:104) (0:106) (0:075)
Number of observations 1,249 1,700 2,243 3,224 1,244 1,151 1,829 3,037 1,519 1,619 2,194 4,186
2;b statistic 951:089 287:234 517:843 500:638 179:068 40:112 76:715 93:444 35:423 54:023 106:264 105:776
p-value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:077 0:062 0:068 0:126 0:103 0:086 0:120 0:118 0:052 0:079 0:132 0:071
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di % erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi & cance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model ' s parameters are zero.
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Table IV : continued.
Estimation Period: 1990 to 1994 Estimation Period: 1995 to 1999
Patent Citations ( uartiles Patent Citations ( uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 0:146 0:531 0:333 0:352 0:011 0:326 0:390 0:406
1 year before the ) ling date (0:081) (0:071) (0:084) (0:047) (0:046) (0:081) (0:067) (0:075)
Total patent pools accumulated, 0:063 0:095 0:059 0:105 0:016 0:026 0:027 0:031
up to 1 year before the ) ling date (0:017) (0:026) (0:013) (0:016) (0:003) (0:005) (0:004) (0:002)
Citations count of citations, by vintages:
Age < 1  0:828 0:222  0:311  0:057  0:002  0:072  0:082  0:018
(0:294) (0:087) (0:183) (0:023) (0:012) (0:053) (0:039) (0:014)
1  Age < 2 0:424 0:366 0:289 0:247 0:012 0:033 0:279 0:131
(0:257) (0:141) (0:152) (0:076) (0:023) (0:052) (0:116) (0:051)
2  Age < 3 0:225 0:329 0:437 0:010 0:021 0:040 0:134 0:110
(0:280) (0:091) (0:113) (0:080) (0:021) (0:058) (0:062) (0:041)
3  Age < 4 0:170  0:02 0:006 0:098  0:084 0:058 0:001  0:008
(0:109) (0:062) (0:015) (0:037) (0:049) (0:034) (0:050) (0:026)
4  Age < 5  0:076 0:126 0:147  0:018 0:030 0:031 0:059 0:039
(0:202) (0:077) (0:061) (0:050) (0:063) (0:042) (0:052) (0:029)
5  Age < 10 0:061 0:091 0:001 0:014 0:049 0:038 0:083 0:032
(0:072) (0:027) (0:026) (0:013) (0:015) (0:015) (0:028) (0:007)
10  Age < 20  0:015 0:012  0:010  0:006  0:065  0:018  0:040 0:004
(0:034) (0:022) (0:004) (0:010) (0:037) (0:015) (0:026) (0:006)
First stage error (^ik) 0:053  0:481
 0:089 0:468 0:001  0:219  0:256  0:316
(0:096) (0:092) (0:082) (0:070) (0:072) (0:093) (0:082) (0:086)
Number of observations 1,839 2,899 3,278 6,115 2,963 3,735 4,574 11,935
2;b statistic 49:198 99:399 70:190 141:632 65:763 58:792 102:104 282:525
p-value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:060 0:115 0:078 0:086 0:027 0:046 0:088 0:110
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di * erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi + cance levels, respec-
tively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model , s parameters are zero.
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Table V: Estimates of the Model of a Patent Race Winner
This table shows the parameter estimates of the model that selects the winner of each patent pool from the set of pre-selected competitors. The estimates
were computed by maximum likelihood and Petrin and Train - s (2003) method to instrument endogenous regressors in the multinomial logit setup. The
estimable model is
Pr(. rmi wins race k) =
exp(0xik + ik)P
j exp(
0
xjk + jk)
:
where the regressors are listed below, and ik represents the unobserved . rm characteristics that are correlated with cash. The instruments for cash holdings
are the two and three year lags of the logarithm of cash, sales, total assets and outstanding debt, and the averages of cash, sales, debt and accumulated
patent pools of all other rival . rms in the same race. The standard errors of the parameter estimates are computed using a bootstrap estimator. They are
shown in brackets underneath the parameter estimate.a The estimation uses all US patent pools won by COMPUSTAT . rms from 1975 to 1999, in the
techonological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patent pools are classi . ed into quartiles according to the number of citations
received. The number of citations is adjusted for time di 1 erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall et al. (2002).
Estimation Period: 1975 to 1979 Estimation Period: 1980 to 1984 Estimation Period: 1985 to 1989
Patent Citations 2 uartiles Patent Citations 2 uartiles Patent Citations 2 uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings,  0:210 0:229 0:326 0:200 0:004 0:264 0:255 0:395 0:163 0:444 0:372 0:326
1 year before the . ling date (0:116) (0:097) (0:183) (0:095) (0:077) (0:109) (0:150) (0:114) (0:091) (0:085) (0:097) (0:069)
Logarithm of total assets,  1:311  0:797  0:585 0:228 1:163 0:265 1:322 1:475  1:182 0:292 1:451 0:300
2 years before the . ling date (0:383) (0:291) (0:307) (0:107) (0:369) (0:537) (0:254) (0:407) (0:530) (0:254) (0:279) (0:211)
Total patent pools accumulated, 0:598 0:556 0:357 0:478 0:220 0:229 0:281 0:285 0:114 0:086 0:132 0:145
up to 1 year before the . ling date (0:256) (0:113) (0:163) (0:081) (0:044) (0:038) (0:048) (0:048) (0:029) (0:020) (0:019) (0:019)
Citations count of citations, by vintages:
Age < 1  0:500  0:826  0:336  0:084  24:428 0:569  0:091  0:369  0:608  0:039  0:102  0:078
(0:339) (0:644) (0:194) (0:034) (2:760) (0:418) (0:069) (0:157) (0:342) (0:063) (0:077) (0:036)
1  Age < 2 0:067 0:038 0:018 0:069 1:183 0:191 0:631 0:210 0:549 0:101 0:319 0:022
(0:043) (0:020) (0:030) (0:021) (0:215) (0:173) (0:255) (0:071) (0:320) (0:092) (0:108) (0:016)
2  Age < 3  7:207  0:081  0:084 0:007 0:111 0:956 0:288 0:515 0:743 0:408  0:017 0:124
(0:324) (0:079) (0:043) (0:009) (0:186) (0:292) (0:195) (0:113) (1:210) (0:119) (0:063) (0:034)
3  Age < 4 0:065 0:018  0:272 0:026  1:814 0:009 0:067 0:165  0:092  0:059 0:116 0:083
(0:055) (0:036) (0:167) (0:014) (0:607) (0:056) (0:060) (0:041) (0:281) (0:180) (0:120) (0:055)
4  Age < 5 0:035 0:013 0:009 0:028 0:06  0:281  0:076 0:144 0:115 0:052 0:089 0:081
(0:037) (0:011) (0:015) (0:010) (0:090) (0:345) (0:192) (0:087) (0:219) (0:078) (0:066) (0:037)
5  Age < 10 0:037  0:016  0:069  0:016 0:008  0:008 0:004  0:001  0:141 0:055 0:049 0:018
(0:022) (0:018) (0:034) (0:009) (0:019) (0:023) (0:012) (0:006) (0:119) (0:056) (0:033) (0:026)
10  Age < 20  9:426 10:015 10:838 12:363  0:416 0:007 0:005  0:007 0:014 0:078 0:006  0:002
(1:216) (0:736) (0:595) (0:646) (0:121) (0:003) (0:005) (0:008) (0:004) (0:039) (0:005) (0:011)
First stage error (^ik) 4:497
 0:214  0:848  0:174 0:022 1:117 0:468  1:334 2:104 0:013  0:572  0:354
(1:661) (0:247) (0:540) (0:293) (0:330) (0:907) (0:479) (0:456) (0:547) (0:168) (0:347) (0:237)
Number of observations 1,249 1,700 2,243 3,224 1,244 1,151 1,829 3,037 1,519 1,619 2,194 4,186
2;b statistic 856:888 290:842 512:524 538:203 192:604 79:160 115:357 121:214 58:936 70:883 147:339 142:008
p-value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:100 0:093 0:077 0:132 0:129 0:158 0:175 0:176 0:092 0:098 0:182 0:090
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di 4 erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi 5 cance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model 6 s parameters are zero.
Table V : continued.
Estimation Period: 1990 to 1994 Estimation Period: 1995 to 1999
Patent Citations 7 uartiles Patent Citations 7 uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 0:271 0:637 0:369 0:172 0:110 0:364 0:636 0:634
1 year before the 8 ling date (0:083) (0:077) (0:076) (0:048) (0:041) (0:079) (0:076) (0:078)
Logarithm of total assets, 0:361 1:426 0:478 0:651 1:587 0:947 1:147 1:500
2 years before the 8 ling date (0:271) (0:268) (0:135) (0:305) (0:262) (0:301) (0:226) (0:379)
Total patent pools accumulated, 0:075 0:134 0:088 0:124 0:028 0:036 0:037 0:035
up to 1 year before the award (0:017) (0:026) (0:013) (0:020) (0:004) (0:006) (0:006) (0:003)
Citations count of citations, by vintages:
Age < 1  0:629  0:187  0:248  0:033 0:008  0:041  0:034  0:024
(0:247) (0:084) (0:193) (0:016) (0:010) (0:039) (0:021) (0:026)
1  Age < 2 0:585 0:546 0:359 0:294 0:035 0:053 0:254 0:136
(0:287) (0:143) (0:169) (0:062) (0:029) (0:064) (0:133) (0:072)
2  Age < 3 0:374 0:463 0:51 0:017 0:004 0:078 0:291 0:148
(0:398) (0:109) (0:124) (0:161) (0:027) (0:062) (0:076) (0:061)
3  Age < 4 0:238 0:024 0:009 0:150  0:020 0:092  0:023 0:033
(0:130) (0:077) (0:015) (0:035) (0:049) (0:038) (0:077) (0:027)
4  Age < 5  0:132 0:167 0:183 0:003 0:060 0:044 0:112 0:062
(0:246) (0:106) (0:069) (0:055) (0:106) (0:060) (0:058) (0:041)
5  Age < 10 0:085 0:145 0:025 0:034 0:102 0:062 0:129 0:058
(0:068) (0:042) (0:025) (0:012) (0:021) (0:019) (0:032) (0:008)
10  Age < 20 0:016 0:026  0:012 0:000  0:034  0:017  0:009 0:014
(0:025) (0:011) (0:004) (0:005) (0:020) (0:015) (0:024) (0:006)
First stage error (^ik) 0:351
  0:992 0:151 0:741  0:668 0:120 0:583  0:461
(0:179) (0:274) (0:153) (0:405) (0:253) (0:150) (0:154) (0:402)
Number of observations 1,839 2,899 3,278 6,115 2,963 3,735 4,574 11,935
2;b statistic 85:498 150:342 174:844 219:968 75:006 91:115 286:927 454:064
p-value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:109 0:199 0:146 0:152 0:114 0:099 0:273 0:200
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di 9 erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi : cance levels, respec-
tively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model < s parameters are zero.
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Table VI: Economic Signicance of the Estimates of the Model of a Patent Race Winner
This table shows the predicted change in the probability of winning a patent pool in a given year with respect to an increase of one
standard deviation of a given regressor, evaluated at the sample mean of all the data. These changes are computed using the parameter
estimates of the model that selects the winner of each patent pool from the set of pre-selected competitors, which are reported in Table
V. The standard errors are shown in brackets underneath the each estimate.a
Change in the probability of winning a patent pool in a year
with respect to a one standard deviation change about the sample mean of
Cash holdings Total assets Accumulated patent pools
Period Patent Citations > ? uartiles Patent Citations > ? uartiles Patent Citations > ? uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1975 to 1979  0:019 0:019 0:026 0:016  0:106 0:064 0:047 0:014 0:005 0:006 0:004 0:005
(0:010) (0:008) (0:015) (0:008) (0:031) (0:023) (0:024) (0:007) (0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Average pools 0:101 0:093 0:088 0:087 0:101 0:093 0:088 0:087 0:101 0:093 0:088 0:087
per @ rm, per year
1980 to 1984 0:000 0:024 0:023 0:030 0:093 0:021 0:099 0:087 0:007 0:008 0:011 0:008
(0:007) (0:010) (0:013) (0:009) (0:025) (0:015) (0:019) (0:010) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Average pools 0:101 0:103 0:100 0:082 0:101 0:103 0:100 0:082 0:101 0:103 0:100 0:082
per @ rm, per year
1985 to 1989 0:014 0:039 0:030 0:024  0:089 0:021 0:080 0:019 0:006 0:004 0:006 0:004
(0:008) (0:007) (0:008) (0:005) (0:014) (0:014) (0:007) (0:007) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Average pools 0:094 0:097 0:090 0:081 0:094 0:097 0:090 0:081 0:094 0:097 0:090 0:081
per @ rm, per year
1990 to 1994 0:024 0:045 0:029 0:013 0:026 0:068 0:028 0:039 0:005 0:004 0:005 0:006
(0:007) (0:005) (0:006) (0:004) (0:013) (0:007) (0:004) (0:005) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Average pools 0:097 0:077 0:085 0:082 0:097 0:077 0:085 0:082 0:097 0:077 0:085 0:082
per @ rm, per year
1995 to 1999 0:008 0:026 0:051 0:047 0:105 0:058 0:054 0:083 0:006 0:004 0:006 0:008
(0:003) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:012) (0:014) (0:008) (0:005) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Average pools 0:079 0:078 0:088 0:080 0:079 0:078 0:088 0:080 0:079 0:078 0:088 0:080
per @ rm, per year
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di A erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi B cance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model C s parameters are zero.
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Table VII: Determinants of R&D in the Patent Race
This table shows the parameter estimates of the determinants of R D D expenditures by E rm.The model is:
lnR&Dik = 
0
xik + ik + k + uik;
where the regressors are listed below. The panel unit, k, is a patent pool and the term k is the R D D component that is common to every E rm, i,
in the set of racing E rms. All speci E cations include year-speci E c e F ects. The parameters are estimated by random or E xed e F ects and the standard
errors are shown in brackets underneath their estimate.a The instruments for cash holdings are the two and three year lags of the logarithm of
cash, sales, total assets and outstanding debt, and the averages of cash, sales, debt, and accumulated patent pools of all other rival E rms in the
same race. The estimation uses all US patent pools won by COMPUSTAT E rms from 1975 to 1999, in the techonological category 3 (Drugs and
Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patent pools are classi E ed into quartiles according to the number of citations received. The number of
citations is adjusted for time di F erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall et al. (2002).
Estimation Period from 1990 to 1994 Estimation Period from 1995 to 1999
G uartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent G uartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings,  0:268 0:142 0:136 0:429 0:494 0:345 0:590 1:333
1 year before the E ling date (0:237) (0:370) (0:045) (0:210) (0:071) (0:081) (0:076) (0:173)
Logarithm of total assets, 1:164 0:830 0:600 0:549 0:369 0:394 0:236 0:278
2 years before the E ling date (0:216) (0:231) (0:039) (0:159) (0:052) (0:059) (0:065) (0:147)
Total patent pools accumulated, 0:007 0:044 0:045 0:035 0:004 0:014 0:009 0:003
up to 1 year before the E ling date (0:035) (0:040) (0:021) (0:013) (0:002) (0:006) (0:003) (0:002)
Citations count of citations, by vintages:
Age < 1 0:006 0:004 0:008 0:008 0:004 0:005 0:002 0:009
(0:019) (0:013) (0:011) (0:008) (0:005) (0:007) (0:007) (0:006)
1  Age < 2  0:627 0:072 0:060 0:003 0:020 0:003 0:127 0:033
(0:493) (0:254) (0:161) (0:054) (0:015) (0:057) (0:055) (0:018)
2  Age < 3 0:004 0:218 0:062 0:022 0:014 0:045 0:009 0:037
(0:365) (0:189) (0:139) (0:030) (0:015) (0:052) (0:041) (0:017)
3  Age < 4  0:414 0:056  0:003 0:016 0:040 0:029  0:001 0:028
(0:216) (0:146) (0:032) (0:021) (0:023) (0:044) (0:035) (0:019)
4  Age < 5  0:002 0:110 0:004 0:041 0:030 0:033 0:008 0:041
(0:254) (0:157) (0:031) (0:028) (0:028) (0:052) (0:038) (0:020)
5  Age < 10  0:029 0:060 0:017 0:026 0:029 0:023 0:021 0:048
(0:084) (0:059) (0:030) (0:012) (0:010) (0:015) (0:013) (0:007)
10  Age < 20  0:082 0:021 0:000 0:003 0:007 0:002 0:006 0:019
(0:031) (0:019) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:011) (0:009) (0:005)
Constant  4:352  3:779  1:317  1:862  0:174  0:140  0:202  0:245
(0:737) (0:380) (0:234) (0:165) (0:113) (0:178) (0:200) (0:215)
Number of observations 1,839 2,910 3,312 6,115 2,963 3,761 4,611 11,948
2;b statistic 1; 399:94 407:73 4; 325:81 19; 977:74 2; 631:84 897:50 36; 340:15 3; 116:47
Overall R2 0:054 0:166 0:138 0:305 0:550 0:263 0:262 0:219
Estimator used FE RE FE FE RE RE FE RE
Hausmann statistic (2;c) 97:27 13:21 23:40 114:69 3:66 14:91 168:04 11:69
Variation explained by the 0:265 0:044 0:084 0:323 0:063 0:074 0:381 0:470
estimated Random H Fixed e F ect
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di I erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi K cance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model L s parameters are zero.
c The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that the random e I ects is both e M cient and consistent.
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Table A.I: Estimates of the Model of a Patent Race Winner
This table shows the estimates of the parameters of the model that selects the winner of a race for a patent pool from the set of all non-cited
N rms that won at least one patent in the same N ve-year period. The estimates were computed using an instrumental variables estimator, following
Berry O s (1994) method. The estimable model is:
ln sit   ln s0t = 
0
xit + it;
where sit is the share of pools won by N rm i in year t, and s0t is the share of patents with self-cited winners. The regressors are listed below. All
speci N cations include year-speci N c dummies. The instruments for cash holdings are the averages of sales, assets, outstanding debt and accumulated
patent pools by all other N rms in the same period S as well as the logarithms of sales, cash, assets and outstanding debt, all in years t  2 and t  3.
The estimates O standard errors are computed using a covariance matrix estimator robust to correlation within the same 2-digit SIC code. They
are shown in brackets under the parameter estimate.a The estimation uses all US patent pools won by COMPUSTAT N rms from 1975 to 1999, in
the techonological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patent pools are classi N ed into quartiles according to the number
of citations received. The number of citations is asjusted for time di T erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall, et al.,
(2002).
Estimation Period: 1975 to 1979 Estimation Period: 1980 to 1984 Estimation Period: 1985 to 1989
Patent Citations U uartiles Patent Citations U uartiles Patent Citations U uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings,  0:144 4:100 1:436 0:517  0:008 0:963 0:316 0:187 0:227 0:587 0:319 1:112
1 year before the N ling date (0:310) (4:075) (1:460) (0:525) (0:469) (0:614) (0:117) (0:034) (0:898) (0:733) (0:484) (0:625)
Logarithm of total assets,  0:107 0:264  0:071 0:069  0:021 0:047 0:166 0:250  0:007 0:288 0:231 0:206
2 years before the N ling date (0:161) (0:234) (0:202) (0:106) (0:224) (0:140) (0:202) (0:126) (0:166) (0:270) (0:191) (0:121)
Total pools of patents accumulated, 0:182 0:205 0:274 0:195 0:171 0:103 0:090 0:180 0:434  0:051 0:203 0:896
up to 1 year before the N ling date (0:107) (0:117) (0:118) (0:071) (0:146) (0:022) (0:088) (0:088) (0:636) (0:425) (0:355) (0:520)
Average pools per N rm 1:156 1:139 1:261 1:302 1:142 1:128 1:128 1:306 1:128 1:139 1:105 1:225
Number of observations 51 62 77 92 41 33 55 55 52 58 72 110
R2 0:570 0:300 0:180 0:360 0:330 0:370 0:380 0:320 0:280 0:230 0:190 0:040
F b statistic 638:58 1; 699:21 13:33 58:28 13:93 460:18 25:28 809:23 666:93 37:11 1; 119:82 150:72
P value OIR 0:998 0:841 0:309 0:514 0:859 0:788 0:532 0:953 0:501 0:174 0:472 0:861
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di V erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi W cance levels, respectively.
b The F statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model X s parameters are zero.
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Table A.I : continued.
Estimation Period: 1990 to 1994 Estimation Period: 1995 to 1999
Patent Citations Y uartiles Patent Citations Y uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:109  0:014 0:437 0:326 1:454 0:678 0:389 0:440
before the Z ling date (0:238) (0:102) (0:276) (0:192) (0:917) (0:391) (0:188) (0:188)
Logarithm of total assets, 2 years 0:018 0:222 0:198 0:089 0:924 0:628 0:257 0:315
before the Z ling date (0:180) (0:162) (0:197) (0:051) (0:541) (0:303) (0:147) (0:136)
Total pools of patents accumulated by 0:172 0:329 0:321 0:243 2:164 1:674 1:383 1:874
the Z rm up to 1 year before the Z ling date (0:266) (0:188) (0:166) (0:110) (0:494) (0:166) (0:095) (0:120)
Average pools per Z rm 1:173 1:190 1:154 1:231 1:519 1:283 1:353 1:778
Number of observations 66 92 106 153 39 64 91 164
R2 0:190 0:150 0:170 0:110 0:330 0:280 0:190 0:120
F b statistic 7:91 2:16 1:09 3:90 3:02 2:19 5:74 3:50
P value OIR 0:263 0:108 0:075 0:573 0:312 0:527 0:101 0:910
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di \ erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi ] cance levels, respec-
tively.
b The F statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the model ^ s parameters are zero.
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Table A.II: Benchmark Estimates of the Model: OLS and Standard ML
This table reports the benchmark estimates of the model that selects the _ rms in the race (Panel A) and the model that selects the winner of
the race (Panel B). The selection model in Panel A is the same as the model in Table A.I, but the estimates are computed by Ordinary Least
Squares. The race winner model in Panel A is the same as the model in Table V, but the estimates are computed by standard maximum likelihood.
All speci _ cations in Panel A include year-speci _ c dummies, and all speci_ cations in Panel B include the incumbency indeces by vintages. The
estimates ` standard errors are computed using a covariance matrix estimator robust to correlation within the same 2-digit SIC code. They are
shown in brackets under the parameter estimate.a The estimation uses all US patent pools won by COMPUSTAT _ rms from 1975 to 1999, in the
techonological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patent pools are classi _ ed into quartiles according to the number of
citations received. The number of citations is adjusted for time di a erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall, et al.,
(2002).
Estimation Period: 1975 to 1979 Estimation Period: 1980 to 1984 Estimation Period: 1985 to 1989
Patent Citations b uartiles Patent Citations b uartiles Patent Citations b uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Entrant Selection Stage
Logarithm of cash holdings, 0:033 0:265 0:013  0:029  0:064  0:024 0:101  0:034 0:000 0:067 0:079 0:016
1 year before the _ ling date (0:167) (0:201) (0:185) (0:103) (0:111) (0:110) (0:097) (0:095) (0:075) (0:088) (0:075) (0:060)
Logarithm of total assets,  0:27  0:227 0:035 0:012 0:027 0:143 0:049 0:047  0:033 0:002 0:017 0:192
2 years before the _ ling date (0:266) (0:209) (0:197) (0:096) (0:106) (0:100) (0:122) (0:069) (0:083) (0:100) (0:076) (0:050)
Total patents pools accumulated, 1:137 1:150 2:232 0:92 0:114  0:525 0:874 0:395 0:186 0:170 0:211 0:539
up to 1 year before the _ ling date (0:870) (0:701) (0:762) (0:452) (0:640) (0:548) (0:602) (0:394) (0:299) (0:369) (0:306) (0:424)
Number of observations 51 62 77 92 41 33 55 55 52 58 72 110
R2 0:51 0:46 0:26 0:37 0:56 0:39 0:31 0:24 0:22 0:17 0:28 0:17
F statistic 99:79 34:77 6:54 70:41 90:07 182:01 25:76 83:75 1319:29 88:64 2032:95 7:96
Panel B: Patent Race Model
Logarithm of cash holdings,  0:347 0:241 0:196 0:073 0:058 0:511 0:274 0:471 0:181 0:430 0:414 0:324
1 year before the _ ling date (0:111) (0:091) (0:158) (0:139) (0:076) (0:095) (0:111) (0:102) (0:094) (0:080) (0:103) (0:068)
Logarithm of total assets, 0:334 0:306 0:291 0:306 0:228 0:260 0:058 0:604 0:079 0:267 0:034 0:376
2 years before the _ ling date (0:119) (0:082) (0:145) (0:124) (0:085) (0:089) (0:085) (0:086) (0:087) (0:070) (0:093) (0:053)
Total patents pools accumulated, 0:560 0:534 0:364 0:503 0:180 0:187 0:221 0:26 0:093 0:087 0:109 0:144
up to 1 year before the _ ling date (0:333) (0:111) (0:158) (0:081) (0:044) (0:037) (0:043) (0:041) (0:027) (0:020) (0:018) (0:020)
Number of observations 1,249 1,700 2,243 3,224 1,244 1,151 1,829 3,037 1,519 1,619 2,194 4,186
2;b statistic 720:071 319:198 557:613 505:248 179:353 77:5 67:605 134:434 37:857 65:838 99:701 132:487
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:069 0:079 0:070 0:097 0:105 0:108 0:097 0:154 0:054 0:092 0:125 0:089
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di c erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi d cance levels, respectively.
b The F and 2 statistics are computed under the null hypothesis that all the model f s parameters are zero.
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Table A.II : continued.
Estimation Period: 1990 to 1994 Estimation Period: 1995 to 1999
Patent Citations g uartiles Patent Citations g uartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Entrant Selection Stage
Logarithm of cash holdings, 0:039 0:028 0:155 0:221 0:104 0:012 0:047 0:145
1 year before the h ling date (0:105) (0:069) (0:057) (0:092) (0:116) (0:105) (0:021) (0:068)
Logarithm of total assets,  0:023 0:054  0:060 0:055 0:046 0:106 0:171 0:064
2 years before the h ling date (0:103) (0:062) (0:055) (0:061) (0:112) (0:083) (0:056) (0:029)
Total patents pools accumulated, 0:293 0:178 0:041 0:320 0:208  0:335 0:103 0:302
up to 1 year before the h ling date (0:472) (0:246) (0:281) (0:213) (0:231) (0:274) (0:173) (0:135)
Number of observations 66 92 106 153 39 64 91 164
R2 0:20 0:25 0:19 0:12 0:26 0:20 0:15 0:14
F statistic 78:92 13:80 6:34 25:62 16:20 2:63 82:30 29:16
Panel B: Patent Race Model
Logarithm of cash holdings, 0:381 0:633 0:518 0:560 0:129 0:426 0:706 0:834
1 year before the h ling date (0:072) (0:061) (0:065) (0:065) (0:054) (0:061) (0:053) (0:061)
Logarithm of total assets, 0:292 0:458 0:300 0:037 0:155 0:322 0:704 0:727
2 years before the h ling date (0:074) (0:050) (0:043) (0:053) (0:054) (0:056) (0:049) (0:054)
Total patents pools accumulated, 0:067 0:115 0:074 0:106 0:018 0:03 0:034 0:034
up to 1 year before the h ling date (0:017) (0:028) (0:013) (0:016) (0:003) (0:005) (0:005) (0:003)
Number of observations 1,839 2,899 3,278 6,115 2,963 3,735 4,574 11,935
2;b statistic 59:218 141:782 96:976 87:867 66:595 84:751 275:021 374:551
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:080 0:158 0:116 0:060 0:035 0:068 0:193 0:167
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di i erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi j cance levels, respec-
tively.
b The F and 2 statistics are computed under the null hypothesis that all the model k s parameters are zero.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the time, in weeks, between the mling dates of
each patent and the next by the same mrm
.
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